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Abstract
We experimentally test the impact of expanding access to basic bank accounts
in Uganda, Malawi, and Chile. Over two years, 17%, 10%, and 3% of treatment
individuals made five or more deposits, respectively. Average monthly deposits for
them were at the 79th, 91st, and 96th percentiles of baseline savings. Survey data
show no clearly discernible intention-to-treat effects on savings or any downstream
outcomes. This suggests that policies merely focused on expanding access to basic
accounts are unlikely to improve welfare noticeably since impacts, even if present, are
likely small and diverse.
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1 Introduction
Bank accounts are essential to daily economic life in developed countries, but are still far
from universal in developing countries: only 54% of adults in developing countries report
having a bank account, compared to 94% in OECD countries (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2015).
Instead of using banks, people save in more informal ways such as keeping cash at home,
which may be costly or risky and which may make many transactions inconvenient. Many
governments and donors believe that there are benefits to moving people into formal banks:
in recent years, groups such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United
Nations, and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion, have put forward goals at the country and
institutional level for access to financial services.
There are several important factors which constrain bank account usage in developing
countries. First, bank accounts tend to be expensive. For example, in our study countries of
Malawi and Uganda, yearly maintenance fees have been reported as being over 20% of GDP
per capita (Beck et al. 2008).1 Accounts may have other non-pecuniary opening costs as
well, for instance if people do not know how to fill out the paperwork to open a bank account
or are intimidated to enter a formal financial institution. Second, bank accounts may be of
low quality on other dimensions, such as long transaction queues, far distance to branches,
and short or unpredictable operating hours (Dupas et al. 2012). Third, people may not
trust banks (e.g., Dupas et al. 2012; Bachas et al. 2016). Fourth, consumers may be too
poor to generate sufficient financial savings to warrant bearing the transaction costs. Fifth,
bank account product and marketing designs may lack tailoring to behavioral constraints,
such as planning fallacies, inattention, and time inconsistent preferences.2
We examine the effect of removing the first barrier (financial costs and administrative
hassle) for unbanked households. A strength of this study is that the same experiment was
conducted simultaneously in three countries (Malawi, Uganda, and Chile), with approxi-
mately 2,000 respondents in each country. The savings accounts offered in each country
were similar: we facilitated the opening of basic, “no frills” accounts, offering minimal inter-
est. We covered all opening and maintenance fees, so that the accounts were completely free
1These high fees may be due to several factors, including that banks find it hard to profitably lend
to creditors in countries where credit markets and credit bureaus are less developed, that overhead costs
are proportionally higher in developing country markets where balances held with banks are low, or that
competition among banks is limited.
2See Karlan et al (2014) for a review of constraints to saving in developing countries.
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to study participants.3 The three countries in our study offer interesting contrasts because
they are at starkly different stages of development and banking access: GDP per capita in
2014 was $253 in Malawi, $677 in Uganda, and $14,520 in Chile (World Bank 2014),4 while
the percentage of households which had an account at a financial institution was estimated
for 2014 at 16% in Malawi, 28% in Uganda, and 63% in Chile (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2015).
In each country, we selected study sites around the catchment area of existing banks.
Since we sought to work with initially unbanked households, we worked in rural areas in
which bank access was lower (the rural population makes up approximately 84% of the
population in Uganda and Malawi, and 11% in Chile). Any household that did not already
have an account at a bank or another financial institution at baseline was eligible for the
study. As would be expected, the percentage of people without accounts was starkly different
in Chile than in the African sites: while 85% of people in Malawi and 77% of people in Uganda
did not have accounts, the figure was only 26% in Chile. Our study sample therefore consists
of individuals who live close enough to existing banks to potentially use them, but who had
not chosen to open accounts on their own before the program (presumably due to financial
or other barriers).
In Malawi and Uganda, we partnered with banks which offered basic savings accounts
with substantial account opening and maintenance fees. The experiment waived all these
fees for two years, and offered assistance with filling out the paperwork required to open
an account. In Chile, we partnered with a bank which already offered an account with no
opening or maintenance fees.5 Despite there being no financial barriers in Chile, qualitative
evidence collected for the study suggested that some people were not familiar with the
account opening and usage procedures; in that site, we therefore decided to facilitate account
opening by helping potential participants with paperwork. Nevertheless, we would expect
lower barriers to account opening in Chile.
The rate of account opening among treatment households was 69% in Malawi and 54%
in Uganda, but was only 17% in Chile where access to banks is higher. A much smaller
percentage actually used the accounts: within two years of follow-up, 10% of households
made at least five deposits in Malawi, 17% in Uganda, and just 3% in Chile. Among these
households, however, usage was substantial: the mean total amount deposited by active
users was $647 in Malawi, $528 in Uganda, and $1,858 in Chile.6 Averaged across the
entire treatment group, the amount deposited per household was $3, $4, and $4 per month,
3These sorts of accounts have been advocated in many developing countries, for example as mandated
by the Reserve Bank of India.
4The World Bank classifies Malawi and Uganda as low-income and Chile as high-income.
5The bank did charge withdrawal fees and also deposit fees after the 5th deposit in a given month.
6All USD figures are provided in 2010 USD.
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respectively. These amounts are not trivial for Malawi and Uganda (where average monthly
individual expenditures are about $15 and $30 per month, respectively), but they are tiny
in Chile, where average monthly household expenditures are about $250 per month.
Even in Malawi and Uganda, as can be seen from the take-up figures, any effects would
have to be driven by the minority of active users – were there enough users to observe
treatment effects? Pooling the three waves of follow-up data, we find that monthly deposits
into formal financial institutions increase for the treatment group by about 0.5% of monthly
income in Malawi and 2.0% in Uganda, compared to the comparison group. While these
small average (intent-to-treat) effects are not surprising since the great majority of people
did not actively use the account, we note that under-reporting of bank savings appears
non-trivial in survey data, especially in Malawi, where average deposits in the last month
are about $0.55 in the survey data (for those with an account) compared to $1.77 in the
administrative data (for Uganda these figures are $2.13 and $2.94, respectively).
Where did the money saved in the bank account come from? One would expect that
some of the money put in the bank accounts was a reshuffling of money from other sources,
in particular money saved at home. Estimating crowd out of home savings is challenging,
since people are reluctant to reveal how much money they keep in cash to an enumerator,
especially in a face to face interview in the home. Consequently, many studies simply do
not ask about home savings (i.e. Dupas and Robinson 2013a). In this study, however, we
extensively pre-tested modules aimed in part to measure home savings. One key addition
is that we measured savings balances, in addition to flows. While balances have the major
disadvantage of missing much of the action, we found flows to be more problematic in such
settings, since transactions are few and far between and therefore occur outside the look-back
period of the survey.
The balance data shows an increase in mean bank balances of $3.9 in Malawi and $8.8
in Uganda for the treatment group. About 50% of this increase appears to be crowd out:
informal savings (which we define as savings at home, in savings groups, and savings with
friends/family) declined by around $2.5 in Malawi and $4 in Uganda (with the bulk of the
decline in cash savings), leaving an overall treatment effect on total savings of $1.4 in Malawi
and $4.8 in Uganda. Compared to the control group mean for total savings of about $14 in
Malawi and $41 in Uganda, this amounts to an approximately 10% increase in total savings
balances in both countries, but this result is not statistically significant in Malawi and only
significant in Uganda when we trim outliers and control for the baseline value. The results
for savings flows show a similarly noisy picture. We expect that this sort of crowd out of
cash savings was also present in earlier studies but not measured. Overall we find at best
very weak evidence for an effect on total savings.
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Finally, we look at a host of downstream outcomes, such as business inventory, expendi-
tures, educational investments and health investments (we conducted follow-ups in Uganda
and Malawi only, since the 3% usage rate in Chile would make it nearly impossible to observe
any impacts). Unsurprisingly given the lack of a clearly discernible average treatment effect
on savings, we find no average effect on any of these outcomes. Effects for the small minority
of active users may be too small to generate an impact on average. Furthermore, those who
did use the accounts had a variety of reasons for saving, and therefore the effects are diffuse
across several channels and their corresponding downstream outcomes. Nevertheless, our
results highlight how the basic accounts offered did not produce beneficial treatment effects
on average for the representative unbanked household in any of the three countries, whereas
other studies, which we will discuss, have found that more specialized or more targeted
accounts can at times generate positive average treatment effects.
What prevents more people from using basic accounts? Our evidence suggests different
explanations between the two poorer African sites and the more developed Chilean site.
In Malawi and Uganda, the constraint seems to be poverty: in follow-up surveys, 89 and
80% of households responded that they did not use the accounts because they did not have
enough money to save. This is consistent with the rest of our data, which suggests that
people are living well below the global poverty line and living essentially hand to mouth
with virtually no savings (respondents in the comparison group report holding a total of
only $14 in Malawi and $41 in Uganda in cash savings). Indeed, we find that baseline wealth
and education predict usage, suggesting that people with more slack in their budgets save
more. In Chile, survey evidence shows that being unbanked (which is much more common
among the elderly) is primarily a choice: in that country, store credit is ubiquitous and the
social safety net is fairly generous in comparison to the African sites (particularly in the
form of pensions and health insurance), so there is relatively little need to save individually,
and people indeed report not needing to save.
There are other important reasons for low usage. We find strong evidence that people
who live further from the bank branches used the accounts less, in both Malawi and Uganda.
Another issue is that the accounts offered virtually no interest, even though inflation was
high (14.0% in Malawi during the study period, and 10.7% in Uganda). In fact, Malawi
went through a major currency devaluation during this time period, in which the Kwacha
devalued by approximately one third. Nevertheless, while important, these were less cited
reasons for low usage, compared to the simple fact of low incomes.
The pattern of usage we observe in our two African sites is similar to several previous
studies in rural Kenya (Dupas and Robinson 2013a, Dupas, Keats and Robinson 2015),
which both find that a majority of initially unbanked households never use accounts they
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are offered but that usage among a subset of active users is substantial. A major difference
here, however, is that there was not enough usage among active users to generate statistically
significant treatment effects on any downstream outcomes. By contrast, the Chile results
suggest a much lower demand for bank accounts among currently unbanked households. To
take stock of these varied findings, we discuss (and include an extensive table) comparing the
target samples, features, usage and primary impacts found in 16 completed randomized trials
of savings products in 13 countries. There is too much heterogeneity in sampling and product
design, as well as what is meant in practice by each product design feature, to conduct a
formal meta-analysis. However, one pattern does emerge: few products appeal to more than
a small minority. Rather than simply expanding access to basic services, expanding access to
a wide variety of products catering to many different needs may thus be needed to generate
noticeable welfare impacts.
2 Background, Experimental Design and Data
2.1 Study sites
This study took place in two low-income African countries (Malawi and Uganda) and the
higher income Latin American country of Chile. These countries are at very different levels
of economic and financial sector development: GDP per capita is $253 in Malawi, $677 in
Uganda, and $14,520 in Chile (World Bank 2014), while the percentage of adults with an
account at a financial institution remained stagnant at 16% in Malawi between 2011 and
2014, and increased from 20 to 28% in Uganda, and from 40% to 63% in Chile over that time
period (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2015). In Malawi and Uganda, censuses were conducted in
2010, accounts were opened in 2011, and follow-up surveys were conducted until 2012-13. In
Chile, the census and account opening were conducted in parallel (in 2010-11), and no follow
up was conducted. Web Appendix Figure WA1 presents a timeline for study activities.
Within each country, we partnered with banks in rural areas where we expected a large
share of the population to be unbanked. We worked in the Balaka and Machinga districts
in Southern Malawi; the Bukomansimbi and Kalungu districts in Central Uganda; and the
Temuco region in Southern Chile.7
In each country, nominal interest rates on the bank accounts were low, so that real interest
7The specific choice of study site was made based partly on priors about banking access and partly for
logistical reasons. In Malawi, we chose to work in the Southern Region because a 2008 FinScope survey
highlighted the region as having the country’s lowest average savings rates. In Uganda, we chose the Masaka
region for convenience (it was not too far from IPA’s offices but was not part of the peri-urban area around
Kampala). Finally in Chile, we chose the Temuco region because it is one of the poorest regions in the
country.
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rates were actually negative. Over the study period of 2010-13, the average annual inflation
rate was 3.7% in Chile, 10.7% in Uganda, and 14.0% in Malawi (World Bank 2015). Also
of importance is that during our sample period, the Malawian central bank devalued the
currency by 34% in May 2012 (Al Jazeera 2012).8
2.2 Partner banks
In each site, we partnered (through IPA / J-PAL) with a financial institution and selected
rural areas in which the partnering institution operated. Each site started with a listing
of households, from which households were randomly drawn for inclusion in the study, and
assignment to treatment and control. More details on the sampling and randomization
procedures are provided below, site by site.
In Uganda, we were unable to find a formal banking institution without prohibitive fees
in rural areas,9 so we instead partnered with a Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO)
called MAMIDECOT (an acronym for the Masaka Microfinance & Development Cooper-
ative Trust). Originally founded in 1999, and incorporated with the Ugandan Ministry of
Tourism, Trade and Industry, MAMIDECOT is a local cooperative owned by its shareholder
“members.”10 We worked with three of the four branches, each located in a different trading
center. MAMIDECOT offers basic savings accounts which pay no interest unless balances
exceed $8.50, in which case the interest rate is 3% (as mentioned above, average inflation
over this time period was about 10% per year). The total cost of opening an account is high
– about $15.11 The accounts also featured monthly maintenance fees of approximately $0.20
per month, but had no withdrawal fees (this maintenance fee was later doubled to $0.40 per
month during our study period). These fees are all quite substantial relative to monthly
expenditures of around $30. Deposits and withdrawals can only be made in person at the
bank during standard bank hours (no ATM cards available).
In Malawi, we partnered with NBS, one of Malawi’s 13 commercial banks. As of early
2013, it had branches or agencies in 37 locations and 73 ATM locations. We worked with
two branches of the bank, in Liwonde and Balaka.12 NBS offers basic savings accounts with
8Exchange rates at the start of the study in 2010 were 478 Chilean Pesos, 2,290 Ugandan shillings, and
150 Malawian Kwacha to US $1.
9The only bank with branches in rural areas was the Post Office Bank, but requirements to open an
account were prohibitive.
10At the onset of the study, it had over 11,500 members serviced by four branches.
11This $15 fee includes $4.25 for a membership fee, $8.50 for two shares, and $2.25 for a passbook. In
addition, a minimum balance of $4.25 is required to keep the account open.
12The Liwonde branch was opened in 2004 and in 2010 had 7,000 accounts; by 2013 it had a total of
12,000 accounts. The Balaka branch opened in March, 2010 and after 9 months of operation, it had 1,475
accounts. By February 2013, it had 4,322 accounts.
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a 4.5% annual interest rate paid on balances of $33 or higher. There are no costs to open an
account. The minimum balance to keep the account open was $3.50 at the start of the study
but was raised to $8.2 within 2 years. Monthly maintenance fees started at approximately
$0.50 per month but were raised three times within our study period to a total of $0.64 per
month within 2 years. There are no withdrawal fees for withdrawals made at the teller, but
there is a $0.40 fee for withdrawals made using an ATM card (the ATM card itself costs
about $7 – both branches have 24 hour ATM access). Again, these fees are quite sizeable
compared to monthly expenditures of about $15 per month.
Finally, in Chile, we partnered with BancoEstado, the only public commercial bank
and the third largest bank in Chile. BancoEstado offers an account with no opening or
maintenance fees called the “CuentaRUT” which every Chilean with a national Chilean
ID/tax number (the “RUT”) is eligible for. Despite the fact that CuentaRUT accounts
are free, their take-up is low among those who live in small towns or villages lacking a
bank branch. In 2010, to increase inclusion, BancoEstado facilitated access by allowing
account holders to make transactions at retailer stores, through a point of sale (POS) machine
(similar to a debit card machine) called Caja Vecina. Account holders can make deposits,
withdrawals, and pay bills through the Caja Vecina.13 However, people who do not have an
account must first visit the bank branch to fill out the necessary paperwork.
2.3 Sampling and Randomization
The details of the sampling procedure in each country are provided in the appendix. We
present a brief summary here.
In Uganda and Malawi, a census exercise was conducted in the catchment areas of the
partner banks to identify unbanked households. In Malawi we additionally conducted a
census at six market centers to oversample households with at least one member involved in
an occupation other than farming.
As expected most households were unbanked in these areas – 74% of households in
Uganda and 85% in Malawi were unbanked. Of the sample of unbanked households, we
applied several exclusion criteria. While these differed somewhat across sites, the most
important criteria were removing households in which both spouses were likely working for a
wage, households which were deemed too far away from the banks to use them regularly, and
households with no female head (see appendix for the full list of exclusion criteria and for
more details). Our study sample includes 2,160 households in Uganda and 2,107 households
in Malawi.
13While deposits (up to 5 per month), purchases and payments are free of cost, withdrawals are charged
$0.62 per transaction. The same cost applies to deposits after the 5th deposit in a given month.
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In both countries, 50% of the households in the sample were randomly allocated (only one
individual per household) to receive the bank account subsidy. In Uganda, randomization
was stratified by gender, occupation14 and bank branch (recall there were 3 branches in
the study). In Malawi, randomization was stratified by gender, occupation,15 marital status,
literacy, bank branch, and whether the respondent was from the household or market sample.
Chile differed methodologically from the other sites in that the census exercise was
not representative of the entire region. Instead, enumerators went door-to-door until they
reached a sample size of nearly 2,000 eligible individuals. A door-to-door census exercise
was conducted in 48 Comunas of Region IX in Southern Chile. During that census exercise,
9,985 respondents were interviewed, out of which 74% already had bank accounts (either the
respondent or spouse). Of the 2,472 respondents without a bank account, 1,975 were willing
to enroll and complete a baseline survey. Among those eligible and enrolled in the study,
half were selected to receive procedural assistance for the intervention. Treatment group was
assigned based on the last digit of the RUT: odd numbers were assigned to treatment, and
even numbers to the control group. Because this was done in the field at the end of the
baseline survey, treatment was not stratified on any characteristics.
2.4 Bank account subsidy offer
In all sites, respondents were given the opportunity to open accounts with no financial costs.
In Malawi and Uganda, account opening and maintenance fees were waived, and so was the
minimum balance requirement.16 Treatment respondents were given a voucher that could
be redeemed for the free account at the bank branch. To open an account, respondents
also needed three passport photos and needed to have their identity certified by the local
village council. To remove the cost of getting the photos and minimize the hassle of the
identity certification, account marketers facilitated this process by offering vouchers for free
passport pictures and by obtaining letters of certification from the local council for the
entire “treatment” sample. In Chile, where accounts were already free, households were
given assistance in filling out the necessary paperwork to open accounts. Below we provide
further details on the specifics of the bank account subsidy country by country.
14The occupation categories were classified as employee, self-employed: vendor, business owner, trader;
or farmer: including animal rearing, and housewife or unemployed.
15The occupation categories were classified as employee, vendor, business owner, trader/farmer or animal
rearing, cash crop farmer, and housewife or unemployed.
16IPA compensated partner banks for the lost fees and balances.
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Uganda Individuals in the treatment group were visited by agents of MAMIDECOT,
four to five months after the baseline.17 The agents gave some basic information about
MAMIDECOT and the accounts, and also explained that the accounts normally featured
various fees that would be waived for the study period. At the conclusion of the visit, the
agents gave respondents a voucher which could be brought to MAMIDECOT and redeemed
for a free account (these vouchers expired after 4 months). Beneficiaries of the free account
were informed that the monthly maintenance fees would be waived for a total of 21 months,
after which the promotion would end and account holders would be responsible for the fees.
In practice the promotion ended in March, 2013, 24 months after vouchers were distributed.
Out of the 1,080 individuals assigned to receive a voucher, 94% accepted the voucher18, and
54% opened an account.
Malawi The procedure in Malawi was largely the same as in Uganda. Individuals in the
treatment group were visited by a NBS agent, were given some basic information about
NBS and the accounts, and were told that the accounts normally featured various fees
that would be waived for the study period.19 At the conclusion of the visit, the agents
gave respondents a voucher (which also expired after 4 months) which could be brought to
NBS and redeemed for a free account. Beneficiaries of the free account were informed that
the monthly maintenance fees would be waived for a total of 18 months, after which the
promotion would end and account holders would have to cover it on their own. In practice
voucher distribution happened in June/July 2011, and the promotion ended in June 2013,
24 months later. Out of the 1,053 assigned to the voucher, 89% accepted the voucher20 and
69% opened an account.21
17These agents were employed jointly by IPA and MAMIDECOT, but they introduced themselves as
employees of MAMIDECOT when interacting with respondents at this visit (the visit was presented as part
of a campaign to attract new customers). This was done to minimize the risk of social desirability bias in
the follow-up surveys, which were carried out by IPA enumerators.
18Of the 68 people who did not accept the voucher, 51 were not interested in the program and 17 were never
found (12 people had moved outside the study region, 1 person had died, and 4 people were untraceable).
19As in Uganda, the agents were jointly employed by IPA and NBS but introduced themselves as NBS
agents, conducting a new customer campaign. They did mention that the fee waiver was sponsored by a
non-profit (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), however. Follow-up surveys were conducted by IPA
enumerators.
20Of those who did not accept the account offer, 69 were not interested and the rest could not be located.
21In Uganda and Malawi, enumerators visited all households in the treatment group for a “study closure”
survey during which we reminded respondents that the fee waiver on the accounts was ending, so that
respondents who chose to keep their account open would have to start paying the fees. As discussed in more
detail below, usage of the accounts was quite low on average. Enumerators reminded them of the fees and
offered procedural assistance to close the account if they wanted to avoid fees.
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Chile At the end of the baseline survey, individuals sampled for the treatment were in-
formed (by the JPAL enumerator conducting the survey) of the existence and of the main
features of the CuentaRUT account and were invited to open an account with BancoEstado.
Any respondent who was interested in an account received assistance with the account open-
ing process. In particular, the enumerator helped respondents fill the application form and
delivered the forms to BancoEstado. Participants were told that they would get an answer
from the bank in 20 days and that they would need to go in person to one branch of the
bank in order to activate the account. In total, 938 households were offered an account. Of
this group, only 17% signed up and activated their account within a few months.
2.5 Data
2.5.1 Baseline surveys
In Uganda and Malawi, the baseline surveys included modules on demographics and socio-
economic status, income, agricultural inputs and outputs, assets, expenditures, savings,
social transfers, cognitive ability, and time and risk preferences. In Chile, we used a shorter
baseline survey that focused on household demographics, participant’s socio-economic char-
acteristics, and sources of income, expenditures and credit.
2.5.2 Follow-up Surveys
In Uganda and Malawi, we conducted three rounds of follow-up surveys, administered ap-
proximately 6, 12, and 18 months after accounts were opened. The follow-up surveys were
similar across rounds, and to the baseline (which allows us to control for baseline values of
most dependent variables in the empirical analysis).
Besides standard outcomes already examined in previous work, a special point of emphasis
in the surveys was the measurement of savings across multiple sources. In any savings study,
one would expect that at least part of the increase in bank savings would come from moving
cash from other places (i.e. crowd out). In our context, the most natural source of crowd out
would be from saving money at home, which is typically hard to measure (especially with
surveys conducted face-to-face, in the home or business where the money may be kept). We
extensively piloted modules to measure such savings, asking both about savings stocks and
flows. While there may still be under-reporting on this measure, we are better positioned to
quantify crowd out and to gauge impacts on total savings than previous work.
Attrition in the follow-up surveys is fairly low and uncorrelated with treatment status.
Our regressions include all respondents who completed at least one follow-up survey (97% of
sample). Attrition on this measure is uncorrelated with treatment (See Web Appendix Table
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WA1).22 In addition, the composition of those who completed at least one follow-up survey
is not different in treatment versus control (the p-value from an F-test for compositional
attrition difference is 0.71 in Uganda and 0.33 in Malawi.). Consequently, Web Appendix
Table WA2 shows that the respondents who remain in the sample post-attrition have very
similar characteristics as the pre-attrition sample, and are balanced between treatment and
control. Web Appendix Table WA3 examines attrition round-by-round, and also finds similar
attrition rates across treatment groups (of about 6-8 percentage points).
In Chile, given the low take-up rate of the bank accounts, we did not conduct full follow-up
surveys to measure impact. Instead, we conducted qualitative follow-ups with a subsample
to understand reasons why people chose not to open accounts.
2.5.3 Administrative account data
We also have administrative data from banks on account activity. However, in Chile, the
bank was not willing to release ID numbers for the bank data, so we are not able to merge
the data to our other surveys (and so instead have de-identified individual data). The data
covers 24 months in Uganda, 22 months in Malawi, and 17 months in Chile.
2.6 Sample Characteristics
Table 1 presents baseline characteristics for the follow-up sample, by treatment status and
for each study site, together with the p-values for the tests of equality between the treatment
and control means. As expected, the treatment and control groups are balanced along most
characteristics.
The summary statistics also highlight key differences between the two East Africa sites
and the Chile site. The Uganda and Malawi sites are much poorer and younger, reflecting
differences in both the sampling strategy (we conducted door to door visits in Chile during
working hours, in a country in which many people have formal employment and were not
likely to be home) and in banking access (Chile has much higher bank account ownership
rates among working age adults). Panel A shows demographic and SES information. The
overall picture in Uganda and Malawi is one of serious poverty. Average years of schooling is
5.5 years in Uganda and 4.2 years in Malawi, both substantially lower than the minimum to
complete elementary schooling (seven years in Uganda and eight in Malawi). Literacy rates
are low: only 77% of people in Uganda and 61% in Malawi can read and write in the local
language. The main sources of income there are entrepreneurship and agriculture.
22We note that all our results are robust to including only those households who answered all four rounds,
with the sole exception that the increase in total monetary savings in Uganda is only significant when using
the larger set of households.
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Panel B shows access to savings. There are big differences across countries. The dominant
form of saving in this unbanked population is in cash at home – in Uganda, 97% of people
report keeping cash at home (to reduce reporting bias we asked about cash at home or in
a secret place), while interestingly in Malawi only 49% do (suggesting that a large share
of people may have close to no savings whatsoever). In Chile reported savings at home is
even lower, at 25%. While this is a surprisingly low figure given Chile’s level of development,
perhaps this is indicative of the ease of finding alternative sources of cash for these households.
We asked about many other sources, including ROSCAs, saving with other people, and
mobile money. In Uganda 23% save in ROSCAs, whereas in Malawi the share is only 5%,
both much smaller percentages than in Kenya (i.e. Dupas and Robinson 2013a). While
we excluded households with formal accounts, we did not exclude those with mobile-money
accounts, which encompass only 3% of our sample at baseline in Uganda , and 0% in Malawi,
where mobile money had yet to be introduced. All in all, reported savings are very low: total
reported savings stocks is only $32 in Uganda, $23 in Chile, and a really low $12 in Malawi.
While we do not necessarily take these values at face value as people may under-report
savings at home to an enumerator, we view them as indicative of extremely low financial
savings.
Panel C presents some basic statistics on income and expenditures. By both measures,
respondents in Uganda and Malawi are very poor, especially in Malawi: total expenditures
in the month before the baseline were only $18 in Malawi and $32 in Uganda (income was
$26 and $32). While we do not have a measure of total household expenditures (since we
only interviewed one respondent), these households are quite likely to be below the global
poverty line.23 In Chile, the income and expenditure questions were asked of the household
rather than the individual: reported values were $250 in expenditures and $270 in income,
much larger than in the two other countries.
3 Results
3.1 Take-up of the Accounts
Table 2 presents statistics on take-up of the accounts. As mentioned earlier, 54% of respon-
dents opened accounts in Uganda, 69% in Malawi, and 17% in Chile. The majority of those
opening accounts did not use them very much as shown in Figure 1, where we present the
distribution of the number of deposits over the study period. In the 3 countries, 42%, 41%,
23We did ask respondents to report the source of income of the spouse, but in many cases they did not
know this value with certainty, if we include those reports income is $41 in Uganda and $34 in Malawi.
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and 6% used the accounts at least once. We define users as “active” if they made at least
5 deposits in the first 2 years after getting the account offer. According to this definition,
active usage rates were 17% in Uganda, 10% in Malawi, and 3% in Chile.24
Among active users, usage is quite high: active users made 13 deposits over the study
period in Uganda, 12 in Malawi, and 14 in Chile, and the average amount of total deposits
among active users was $528 in Uganda, $648 in Malawi, and $1,858 in Chile. These figures
imply average monthly deposits of about $22, $24, and $110 per month for active users, and
$4, $3, and $4 for the overall treatment group (total deposits were calculated over 22 months
in Malawi, 24 in Uganda and 17 in Chile due to data availability). These amounts are not
trivial for Malawi and Uganda (where average monthly individual expenditures are about
$15 and $30 per month, respectively), but they are tiny in Chile, where average monthly
household expenditures are about $250 per month. The pattern of usage we observe here is
similar to several previous studies in rural Kenya (Dupas and Robinson 2013a, Dupas, Keats
and Robinson 2015), which both find that a majority of households never use the accounts,
but usage among active users is high.
Figure 2 plots the cumulative density function of the total amount deposited into the
account over the study period. On each graph, we also plot a line for the balance for which
the interest on deposits would cover the fees (so that the accounts would yield a positive
financial return). Given the interest rates, these would be very large balances: $702 in
Malawi and $348 in Uganda. Very few people save this much (just 13% in Uganda and 3%
in Malawi). This suggests that, absent the fee waiver offered for the study, these accounts
are unaffordable for the majority of unbanked households–and it is worth noting that the
fees charged by financial institutions chosen for this study are comparable to those charged
by most institutions throughout the African continent (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2015).
Figure 3 plots usage over time. Interestingly, while average usage is fairly modest, people
who do use the accounts continue to use them throughout the study period. As can also
be seen, people deposit and withdraw at similar rates over time. Consequently, account
balances do not increase very much over time, suggesting that the account balance is a poor
measure of usage in this context.
24This definition differs from Dupas and Robinson (2013a), which only had 6 months of bank usage data
and thus defined active usage as making at least 2 deposits over the first 6 months. Prina (2015) uses their
definition in her comparison of take-up across studies even if studies have a longer window (Table 3 in her
paper). With their definition, the figures in our study are 32% in Uganda, 25% in Malawi and 5% in Chile.
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3.2 Determinants of Take-up
We next examine the correlates of take-up and active usage of the bank accounts in the
treatment group. We look at two primary outcomes: the “active usage” dummy defined
above, and total deposits (for which we use an inverse sine hyperbolic transformation to
approximate a log specification without dropping the zeroes, as is common in this literature
(see Prina 2015 and Callen et al. 2014). Since the Chilean bank did not give us access to
personal identifiers in the administrative account data, the only outcome we can examine
there is accepting our offer of assistance to open the account.
Results are presented in Table 3. There are three important predictors of usage that are
statistically significant in both Uganda and Malawi: distance to the bank branch, years of
education and a proxy for wealth (the log value of agricultural and household assets). The
negative correlation between distance and usage is likely due to travel costs and is suggestive
that access to the branch is a constraint.25 The positive correlation between usage and years
of education and asset holdings is suggestive that better-off households have more income
to allocate to savings, though could also operate through other channels, such as human
capital. This correlation has also been found in previous work, such as Dupas and Robinson
(2013a) and Dupas, Keats, and Robinson (2015). We find some evidence that baseline
savings are correlated with usage, in particular savings at a ROSCA in Uganda, and home
savings in Malawi. In contrast to Dupas and Robinson (2013a), we find no differences in
take-up between genders or across occupations.
Overall, we can’t predict very well who the active users are based on observables. The
R-squared in the regressions in Table 3 never goes beyond 0.11. Among other things, that
means that we cannot use a propensity score matching algorithm to identify who in the
control group would have been likely active users, in order to compare active users with their
proper counterfactual and increase statistical power compared to a standard “intention-to-
treat” (ITT) estimation.
3.3 Comparing administrative to survey data
Our main results for treatment effects on total savings use the survey data from the follow-
ups, since these are the only measures we have for the control group. How accurate is this
data? Web Appendix Table WA4 shows figures on deposits in the month before the date of
each follow-up survey, from the survey and from the administrative data. Averaging across
rounds, average deposits in the survey data were $2.13 in Uganda and $0.55 in Malawi,
25Alternatively, this correlation could certainly be due to other differences between households that live
close to towns and households that live further away. Note however that the correlation is conditional on
most obvious covariates.
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substantially lower than the average of $2.94 and $1.77 from the administrative data. The
table shows that the survey data has fewer large transactions: the standard deviation of
deposits is at most half as large compared to the administrative records in both countries,
and there is a wide discrepancy in the highest percentiles of the deposit distribution. The
balance data is closer to the truth, and even possibly overstated (average reported balances
were $21 in Uganda and $9 in Malawi, compared to true values of $12.5 and $8 recorded
by the banks). To deal with this misreporting, in the main specifications we winsorize at
1%, which brings the two measures much closer together (but for completeness we also show
non-winsorized results in appendix). While this type of measurement error is unlikely to be
unique to our case and has been an issue in any study of this type, its presence suggests that
effects on savings balances will tend to be understated.
Another note of interest concerning the administrative data shown in Table WA4 is that
the 30 days before the surveys (the periods over which deposits were self-reported) had lower
bank usage than the average month in the period: while administrative data suggests average
monthly deposits over the entire study period was $4 in Uganda and $3 in Malawi, for the
months covered by the surveys the same administrative records show averages of only $3
in Uganda and $1.8 in Malawi. This means that the snapshot obtained from surveys may
further dampen observed impacts on total savings.
3.4 Impact on savings and other downstream outcomes
In Uganda and Malawi, we examine the effects of the accounts on a number of outcomes from
the follow-up data (in Chile, as discussed above, we did not collect follow-up data because the
take-up of the account was so low). We use the experimental variation to examine differences
in outcomes between the treatment and control groups. Since the experiment was randomized
and we have baseline measures of most outcomes, regressions are very simple. For a given
outcome Yhst for household h in strata s in wave t (see Section 2.3 for details on the strata),
we run the following ANCOVA regression
Yhst = αThs + βYhs1 + µs + θt + εhb (1)
where we control for the baseline value of the outcome (Yhs1), stratification dummies (µs)
and wave dummies (θt). All monetary values are winsorized at the 99th percentile to reduce
the prevalence of outliers. Whether winsorizing is the correct thing to do when usage is so
skewed is unclear however – we therefore show non-winsorized results in Table WA5 and
WA6. The coefficient α represents the Intent-to-Treat effect.
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3.4.1 Savings
Results for savings are reported in Tables 4 (deposits over the 30 days prior to the survey)
and 5 (savings balances). Table 4 shows a treatment effect on monthly deposits in financial
institutions (commercial banks, microfinance banks, and Savings and Credit Cooperatives,
including the partner bank) of just $0.74 in Uganda and $0.13 in Malawi. These are fairly
small figures, amounting to about 2% of individual labor income in Uganda and 0.5% in
Malawi. Table 4 also shows substantial crowd out – in fact, the effect on overall deposits is
not significant. We take this as at best suggestive since there is a lot of error in measuring
these flows, and we prefer to rely on the saving stock data to quantify crowd out.26
Table 5 (savings balances) is our preferred specification to explore crowd out since, as
mentioned earlier, the limited window over which savings flows was measured missed most
of the activity. Column 1 shows that the stocks of savings went up by $8.8 in Uganda and
$3.9 in Malawi. Both effects are statistically significant, but are again quite small.27 We
find evidence of crowd out: in Uganda, savings in other sources declined, most notably home
savings which declined by $2.7; in Malawi, home savings declined by $2. Thus, the overall
increase in monetary savings amounted to $5 in Uganda (statistically significant in Table 5,
but this is not robust to not winsorizing the top 1% as can be seen in Table WA6) and $1.4
in Malawi (not significant). As percentages, these are about 10% of control group savings
(which are $41 in Uganda and only $14 in Malawi), and about 1% of annual expenditures
(which are $350 in Uganda and $180 in Malawi, calculated from Table 6). When we pool
the two countries together the treatment effect on total savings is significant at the 5% level,
but again the magnitude of the effect is very low. We also note that in Uganda the baseline
level of total monetary savings was about USD 5 smaller in the treatment group, thus the
effect estimated in the ANCOVA regression could be due to reversion to the mean (if we do
not control for the baseline value, the treatment effect is positive but not significant (not
shown)).
Overall, our reading of these results is that the average treatment effect on total savings
was at best very modest, and not clearly differentiable from zero.28
26Columns 1 and 2 in Web Appendix Table WA7 replicate Table 4 by using the administrative data on
deposits at SACCOs (Uganda) or Banks (Malawi) instead of the reported data for people with at least one
deposit. Results are very similar to those presented in Table 4, though the effect in formal deposits increases
(but it is still quite low in absolute terms), and the total deposits becomes statistically significant.
27Another reason balances are modest can be seen in Figure 3, which shows that withdrawals and deposits
were roughly of the same order of magnitude among users – users were taking out what they were putting
in.
28Columns 3 and 4 in Web Appendix Table WA7 replicate Table 5 by using administrative data on
balances at the moment of the survey instead of reported savings at SACCOs (Uganda) and Banks (Malawi)
for those with positive balance data. The effect size in Uganda is here again smaller and the effect on total
savings becomes not statistically significant.
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3.4.2 Other downstream outcomes
For completeness, Table 6 reports results of the bank account offer on a host of important
downstream outcomes, including business investment, expenditures, transfers to and from
others, health, and education. We find no statistically significant effects on any outcome.
Table 7 shows effects on a set of attitudes and beliefs. Here again we find no effect on
any outcome, with the one exception of trust in banks. Ultimately, we conclude that if
the accounts did benefit the subset of active users, there are evidently too few of them to
meaningfully affect these average treatment effects.29
4 Understanding Low Take-up
4.1 Uganda and Malawi: Poverty, Inflation and Transaction Costs
The take-up analysis in Table 2 shows a correlation between usage and baseline wealth,
and between usage and distance from the branch, suggesting that baseline poverty as well
as transaction costs might be important impediments to usage. To further explore this, at
endline we asked respondents why they did not use the accounts more. These results are
reported in Table 8. In Panel A, we asked treatment group non-users what barriers prevented
them from saving. The dominant answer was simply that people were too poor to save: 80%
of respondents in Uganda and 89% in Malawi gave this answer.
In Uganda we further asked people why they find it hard to save in any source (not
necessarily the bank) – shown in Panel C, 90% of respondents mention having low income
as one of their top 2 reasons. Other main factors mentioned as main reasons are related
to expenditures: 73% state that expenses are too high and 82% answered that unexpected
emergencies make it difficult to save. These all refer to the same basic problem that income is
not enough to generate savings once subsistence expenditures have been taken care of. These
poverty-related, self-reported barriers to bank usage are broadly consistent with the poverty
levels observed in our surveys. Self-reported expenditures in Malawi are just $15 per month
29In Malawi and Uganda, we had stratified the randomization of the bank account offer by gender and
occupation in order to test for heterogeneity in the effects across subgroups. We do not report this analysis
in the paper for brevity, but we have run this regression as pre-specified and found no systematic evidence
that some subgroup saw impacts from the treatment. In particular, we do not see effects among vendors, in
contrast with Dupas and Robinson (2013a). A major difference between the vendors in this sample and those
in Dupas and Robinson (2013a) appears to be in their average income – vendors in Dupas and Robinson
(2013) report earning more money and may thus have had a higher ability to save. Another important
difference between the two settings is that inflation was larger in Uganda and especially in Malawi over the
study period than it was in Kenya at the time of the Dupas and Robinson (2013) study five years earlier. In
the next section, we discuss in more detail these potential explanations, and others, for the lack of take-up
and impacts.
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and total savings stocks are just $12 total. In Uganda, these figures are $30 per month and
$30 savings total. These are much lower than in other studies such as Dupas and Robinson
(2013), Prina (2015) and Callen et al. (2014). We provide additional summary statistics
on the economic lives of individuals in the Uganda and Malawi sample in Table WA8. The
overall picture that emerges is one of subsistence living, with over 85% of farm produce
being self-consumed, very low levels of cash income, and very low levels of remittances being
received from outside the village.
Poverty is not the only reason people did not use the accounts, however – in particular,
while we have shown that people hold very little financial savings, they do have some savings.
In both countries, we tried to shed light on this by asking people who saved in a source other
than the bank why they chose not to use the bank (i.e. these are people that have some
savings but chose not to hold it at the bank), the results of which can be found in Panel B.
This encompasses nearly all respondents – 96% of respondents in Uganda and 94% in Malawi
say that, at least sometimes, they save money in some other source. Around 33% in Uganda
claim that it is because they do not have enough money to save in a bank account. Relatedly,
in Malawi 33% report that depositing on the account is not worth it since they would need
to withdraw it shortly to finance consumption, and 37% report not being able to accumulate
enough of a sum to warrant a trip to the bank. Other factors that were commonly reported
are liquidity: the money at the bank is not available when needed (30 % in Uganda) and
distance to the bank (17% on average in the two countries).30 These results suggest that, in
addition to poverty, the illiquidity of the bank account was a deterrent (which is corroborated
by the take-up analysis, which showed that distance negatively predicted usage).
A final issue is that both Uganda and Malawi experienced high rates of inflation during the
study period. Figure WA1 shows how the peak inflation periods coincided with our study
phases. In Uganda, inflation spiked shortly after the bank account offer. In Malawi, the
particularly spectacular inflation, driven by the 34% devaluation of the Malawian currency
by the central bank in May 2012, started almost a year after the intervention. There is
no clear break in bank usage around the time of the devaluation among the few study
participants that used the accounts however – in particular, no increase in withdrawals just
before the devaluation (see Figure 3).
30These results do not appear specific to our study sites. In 2011, a multi-country nationally representative
survey conducted by the World Bank (FINDEX) found that “lack of money” was the primary reason given
for not owing an account, at 83% in Uganda and 88% in Malawi, followed by the costs of the accounts (52% in
Uganda and 24% in Malawi), distance (41% in Uganda and 12% in Malawi), lack of required documentation
(38% in Uganda and 18% in Malawi) and lack of trust (24% in Uganda and 9% in Malawi).
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4.2 Chile: Widespread insurance and credit access
Understanding the reasons for the modest take-up became the primary question of interest for
the Chile site. A qualitative survey was administered to 639 individuals from our treatment
group in May 2012 in order to gauge their relative importance. We find evidence for several
important factors.
First, recall that bank account ownership is much higher in Chile than the other two
sites, with 74% of respondents we interviewed in our door-to-door census exercise reporting
already having accounts (despite the fact that we focused our study in the poorest region of
Chile and in communities with the lowest bank account penetration according to our partner
bank BancoEstado). In addition, bank accounts were readily available at no financial cost.
This is a very different context from the Uganda and Malawi sites, and strongly suggests that
people without accounts in Chile chose not to open them because they did not want them.
As shown in Table 1, unbanked respondents in Chile were predominantly older women who
were out of the labor market and relied on others for financial support (26% report that their
main source of income is the wage of other household members, and another 35% report that
it is their pension or other government assistance).
Second, Chile is a much more developed economy than Malawi and Uganda and offers
various support programs for poor people. Panel A of Table 9 presents evidence on gov-
ernment support. 73% of households receive government assistance (50% of them receive a
family subsidy that includes free medical care and dental treatment), 32% receive some type
of pension, and 85% receive either government assistance, a pension, or both. Among those
who do not receive a pension, 76% expect to receive one in the future. Government assistance
and pensions are distributed monthly, constituting a reliable income stream for a majority of
the sample. Our follow-up data shows that the vast majority (96%) of government transfer
recipients receive them without a bank account, and only 23% of current transfer recipi-
ents see a benefit to having the transfer deposited directly into a bank account. In all, the
system of government transfers is highly utilized and perceived to be highly effective, likely
attenuating the demand for savings accounts.
Healthcare also seems to be comprehensive for the sample as shown in Panel B of Table
9. 86% of the sample believes that the cost for a major medical procedure like surgery would
be mostly or completely covered by government programs. The share the household would
expect to pay for a surgery is low: it is 0 for 62% of the sample and 25% for another 19%.
Healthcare that is expected to be comprehensive further mitigates the need to privately store
funds to respond to health shocks.
Third, the Chile population enjoys easy access to low-cost credit, reducing the need to
privately save for a specific purpose or an emergency. Using baseline data, Panel C of Table 9
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shows that 30% of respondents reported having obtained a loan or credit card from a formal
institution, and 11% had an active credit line or credit card. In addition, in our follow-up
survey, 48% report having bought an item on installment payments in the previous year.
Moreover, when respondents are asked how they would get money to cover an emergency
that requires around $600, only 1% reported that they would use savings, while 17% reported
they would get a loan from a bank or formal institution, 5% would get a loan from other
sources, and 23% from family or friends. While many of these respondents also mention that
the interest rates on these loans are high, nevertheless these figures suggests that credit from
multiple formal and informal sources is both accessible and widely used.
5 Comparison with other savings studies
Table 10 provides a detailed meta-comparison of 16 recent studies including randomized trials
of savings products. The most similar (i.e., closest to a “basic” savings account) papers are
Dupas and Robinson (2013a) with Kenyan vendors and bicycle taxis, Prina (2015) with
women living in slums in Nepal, and Dupas, Keats and Robinson (2015) with unbanked
households in rural Kenya. Each of these prior studies observed some effect on at least one
downstream outcome for at least a subsample, such as business investment/expenditures for
female vendors (Dupas and Robinson 2013a), perception of financial well-being among poor
women (Prina 2015), or dependence on remittances and financial support to others for dual-
headed households (Dupas, Keats and Robinson 2015). As discussed earlier, we checked for
the presence of impacts on such sub-samples in our data but did not find any significant
patterns. What explains this difference?
As it turns out, the take-up pattern we observe is not that far from these other studies.
The two closest papers conducted in East Africa are Dupas and Robinson (2013a) in which
only 35% of people ever used the account, and Dupas, Keats and Robinson (2015) in which
only 28% did. As here, the people who used the accounts saved fairly large sums, however,
and so the positive treatment effects were driven by a minority of users who benefited greatly.
The pattern in the closely related study of Prina (2015) in Nepal is somewhat different : 80%
of people took up accounts in that study and most users made many deposits.
We postulate that the main reason that usage was lower in our study sites is that people
in Chile did not have much use for accounts, and that people in Uganda and Malawi did
not use the accounts much because they were poorer than in previous studies. In addition,
we find strong evidence that people who lived further from the bank used the accounts
less, suggesting that travel costs were an impediment. The discrepancy in the emergence
of downstream outcomes among users may come from the fact that the impacts were more
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diverse and thus harder to observe in Uganda and Malawi.
However, there are also other features of the interventions that might explain the dif-
ferences. Prina (2015) worked with an NGO which operated local banking locations in the
slums where people lived, for 3 hours per day twice per week. These mobile branches re-
duced transaction costs substantially; in addition, the pre-arranged schedule of visits may
have served as a reminder or coordination device for people. The respondents in Dupas and
Robinson (2013a) were all entrepreneurs working in a market where the bank was located, so
transaction costs were most likely smaller. In addition, the collection of logbooks from partic-
ipants could have produced a behavioral attention-increasing “nudge” that, when interacted
with the treatment of a bank account, led to higher savings for a subset of the treatment
group. Another possible difference is that the accounts in Dupas and Robinson (2013a)
and Dupas, Keats and Robinson (2015) had withdrawal fees, which might have acted as a
(weak) commitment device (note, however, that Chile had withdrawal fees as well, so this
explanation is not relevant to explain lower usage there). A final possibility is that several
of these studies were operated by NGOs (Prina 2015) or marketed by NGOs at the outset
(Dupas and Robinson 2013a and Dupas, Keats and Robinson 2015). The NGO may have
implicitly signaled that it was in people’s best interest to save more (compared to a bank
which is trying to maximize its own profits) or may have induced people to expect benefits
from the NGO from complying (i.e., individuals may perceive that satisfying the guidance of
an NGO could lead to future benefits). This is unlikely to be the main explanation though:
while accounts were not endorsed in Uganda or Chile, they were endorsed by the NGO in
Malawi and yet take-up was still low.
Extending past the “basic” savings accounts, Panel C in Table 10 shows usage and treat-
ment effects for more “behavioral” savings accounts and features, including commitments
(commitments to deposit, commitments to no withdraw), reminders, labeling of accounts,
peer effects or financial literacy training. For most studies the sample was narrowly selected
(the sample is often composed of previously banked households; Dupas and Robinson 2013b
focused on those self-selected into participating in a ROSCA) and therefore comparisons
with our representative sample of unbanked households are difficult. Overall, the pattern
that emerges, if any, is that different features matter for different segments of the population,
with no “one size fits all”.
6 Conclusion
Bank accounts as currently offered appear unappealing to the majority of individuals in our
three samples of unbanked, rural households – even when these accounts are completely
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subsidized. While we do observe substantial usage among a subset of active users, we are
unable to pick up any statistically significant effects on downstream outcomes. This is not
surprising since the average impact on total savings is itself relatively modest at best, and
noisily estimated. If any, treatment effects on downstream outcomes are likely diffuse since
savings purposes are heterogeneous, thus difficult to detect, because of little ability to predict
how user households would use the savings.
One important question is whether the approximately 80% of individuals in our Malawi
and Uganda samples who did not make much use of their account are simply too poor to
save at all, or whether the bank accounts were simply not well tailored to their needs or
habits. We provide suggestive evidence that poverty is the main limiting factor. In both
sites, but especially in Malawi, households hold limited savings in any source. We find that
assets are predictors of usage in both sites. However, we find some suggestive evidence that
barriers such as transaction costs limit usage too: distance to the bank is a predictor of
usage in both sites. Overall, our results suggest that while there may be an unmet demand
for formal savings instruments in rural Africa, bare-bones bank accounts are not appealing.
Therefore, pushing for existing formal institutions to expand their services to rural areas,
even with one-time account opening subsidies, may not be enough to broaden financial access
and definitely will not yield the hoped for poverty alleviation results.
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Figure 1. Distribution of Number of Deposits
Notes: This plots the distribution of number of deposits onto sponsored bank accounts among
individuals who were offered an account. Number of deposits is calculated over 24 months in Uganda,
22 months in Malawi and 17 months in Chile. 
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Figure 2. Deposits and Fees
Notes: This plots the CDF of total deposits onto sponsored bank accounts among individuals in the
treatment group who opened an account, in the first two years after accounts were offered. The dashed
vertical line shows the total value of monthly fees that would have been owed onto the account over
the two year period had the account not been sponsored. The solid vertical line shows the threshold
total deposit amount needed for the interest rate paid on the accounts to equalize the fees. Thus only
those with a total deposit amount above that threshold would face a non-negative interest rate, absent a
fee waiver.
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Figure 3. Evolution of Usage Over Time, from Administrative Data
Notes: Plots show evolution of total deposited and total withdrawn to date over time, as well as their difference. 
The y-axis are in local currencies as the exchange rate changed over the study period in Malawi hence making 
comparisons over time in USD somewhat difficult. The "50 USD" text boxes at placed to show the exchange 
rate at the beginning and end of the study period.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control 
Mean 
(S.D.)
Treatment 
difference 
(Std. Err.)
Control 
Mean 
(S.D.)
Treatment 
Difference 
(Std. Err.)
Control 
Mean 
(S.D.)
Treatment 
Difference 
(Std. Err.)
Panel A. Demographics and SES
Female 0.72 0.00 0.68 0.00 0.78 -0.02
(0.45) (0.02) (0.47) (0.02) (0.41) (0.02)
Main Occupation
Entrepreneur 0.46 0.01 0.37 0.00 0.10 -0.01
(0.50) (0.02) (0.48) (0.02) (0.30) (0.01)
Farmer 0.32 -0.01 0.23 0.00 0.03 0.00
(0.47) (0.02) (0.42) (0.02) (0.18) (0.01)
Employee 0.17 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.17 0.00
(0.38) (0.02) (0.45) (0.02) (0.37) (0.02)
Housewife/Unemployed 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.70 0.01
(0.21) (0.01) (0.31) (0.01) (0.46) (0.02)
Age 36.23 0.11 39.79 -0.33 51.54 -0.05
(11.90) (0.52) (17.00) (0.73) (16.74) (0.75)
Married 0.71 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.46 0.01
(0.45) (0.02) (0.45) (0.02) (0.50) (0.02)
Household size 5.15 -0.04 4.60 -0.07 3.80 0.01
(2.39) (0.10) (1.99) (0.09) (1.95) (0.08)
Years of education 5.49 0.01 4.21 -0.15
(2.95) (0.13) (3.44) (0.15)
Acres of Land Owned by household 1.51 0.07 2.19 0.06
(2.17) (0.11) (1.88) (0.08)
Value of Household and Agricultural Assets  373.66 32.91 144.26 6.12
(694.09) (65.66) (270.67) (16.45)
Distance to bank branch in km 2.68 -0.09 6.03 -0.32
(2.03) (0.09) (3.22) (0.14)
Panel B. Savings
Participates in ROSCA 0.23 0.00 0.05 -0.01
(0.42) (0.02) (0.22) (0.01)
Holds savings in cash at home 0.97 -0.02 0.49 0.00 0.25 -0.02
(0.18)      (0.01)** (0.50) (0.02) (0.44) (0.02)
Holds savings with friends/family 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.01
(0.31) (0.01) (0.25) (0.01) (0.15) (0.01)
Holds savings in mobile money account1 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.18) (0.01) 0.00 0.00
Holds other cash savings2 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.15) (0.01) (0.07) 0.00
Total Monetary Savings 31.80 -5.35 11.82 0.60 23.22 -4.52
(111.87) (4.33) (45.00) (2.08) (148.94) (5.40)
If you needed USD 25 urgently, how would you get the money? (For Chile, asked about USD 60)
   Would use (only) savings 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00
(0.22)      (0.01)** (0.13) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01)
   Would use savings and other method 0.27 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00
(0.44) (0.02) (0.20) (0.01) (0.16) (0.01)
   Would borrow/ask from friends/family 0.78 0.02 0.38 -0.01 0.61 0.00
(0.82) (0.04) (0.62) (0.03) (0.49) (0.02)
   Would sell animals (Chile: sell something) 0.35 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.00
(0.88) (0.04) (0.34)      (0.02)* (0.15) (0.01)
   Would be impossible to get it 0.16 0.00 0.41 -0.02 0.19 -0.02
(0.40) (0.02) (0.49) (0.02) (0.39) (0.02)
Panel C. Income and Expenditures
Total expenditures(last month)3 32.06 -0.59 17.80 -1.35 250.05 -13.16
(51.08) (2.43) (45.74) (1.60) (216.78) (9.17)
Labor income (last month)3 32.48 -5.88 25.72 2.79 270.56 13.50
(95.45) (4.38) (67.27) (3.77) (426.39) (17.64)
P-value (Joint F-test) 0.33 0.79 0.46
Observations 2159 2107 1967
Notes: Randomization in Uganda was stratified on occupation, gender and bank branch, while in Malawi it was based on occupation, gender, marital 
status, literacy, and whether the respondent was from the household or market sample.  The table uses values of the variables collected in Round 1 
Survey  (Oct-Nov 2010 in Uganda, Feb-Mar 2011 in Malawi and Dec 2010-Mar 2011 in Chile). All monetary values are expressed in June-2010 US 
dollars.  Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8: means for the treatment-control difference and robust standard errors in parentheses obtained from a regression of each 
variable on treatment.                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
1 The question was introduced later in the baseline survey and was only asked of 1,661 households in Uganda.
2 Other cash savings: savings with shopkeeper or employer, farmer groups and village leader.  
3 The question asks about total expenditures and income of the respondent in Uganda and Malawi and of the household in Chile.
 Table 1. Baseline Summary Statistics
Uganda Malawi Chile
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Active Users Only All
Active Users 
Only All
Active Users 
Only
Opened account 0.54 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.17 1.00
Ever used account (at least 1 deposit) 0.42 1.00 0.41 1.00 0.06 1.00
Made at least 2 deposits within first 2 years 0.32 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.05 1.00
Active user (Made at least 5 desposits within first 2 years) 0.17 1.00 0.10 1.00 0.03 1.00
Total number of deposits 2.67 12.83 1.78 12.06 0.49 14.24
Total number of withdrawals 1.44 6.87 1.42 10.95 0.56 15.07
Total value of deposits 106.54 528.59 74.56 647.64 66.01 1858.11
Total value of withdrawals 90.01 446.47 70.47 623.80 58.17 1494.89
If ever deposited, median deposit size 13.10 29.37 11.44 29.23 5.68 82.64
If ever withdrew, median withdrawal size 19.97 54.56 10.29 33.57 8.67 104.86
Total Savings at baseline from Survey Data 26.45 29.26 12.42 34.28 18.70 N/A
Number of observations 1079 180 1053 106 938 29
Table 2. Take-up of Sponsored Bank Account among Assigned to Treatment
Uganda Malawi Chile
Notes: Samples restricted to those offered a sponsored account. The sponsored account offer was made in March-April 2011 in Uganda and in 
June-July 2011 in Malawi. "Active user" is defined as making at least 5 deposits within 2 years. Monetary values are deflated to June 2010 values 
and converted to nominal USD. Total deposits are calculated over 24 months in Uganda, 22 months in Malawi and 17 months in Chile due to 
data availability. 
In Chile, opened account is defined as within 5 months of the baseline due to bank data availability.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Chile
Active1 Active1
Accepted 
Assistance
Demographics
Female 0.048 -0.200 -0.244 -0.004 0.305 0.343 -0.086
(0.029) (0.209) (0.212) (0.024) (0.179)* (0.178)* (0.048)*
Not Married 0.099 0.464 0.538 0.006 -0.313 -0.307 -0.026
(0.106) (0.693) (0.696) (0.128) (0.788) (0.794) (0.054)
Female x  Not Married -0.096 -0.470 -0.540 0.016 0.543 0.508 0.089
(0.108) (0.711) (0.715) (0.130) (0.804) (0.809) (0.061)
Household Size 0.010 0.097 0.102 -0.001 0.054 0.054 -0.086
(0.006)* (0.038)** (0.038)*** (0.006) (0.042) (0.042) (0.051)*
Age (1/10s of years) 0.070 0.729 0.681 0.092 0.757 0.770 0.004
(0.064) (0.457) (0.458) (0.031)*** (0.230)*** (0.227)*** (0.005)
Age Squared -0.003 -0.049 -0.043 -0.009 -0.066 -0.067 0.132
(0.008) (0.056) (0.056) (0.003)*** (0.024)*** (0.023)*** (0.055)**
Entrepreneur 0.058 0.577 0.493 0.029 0.348 0.288 -0.098
(0.049) (0.333)* (0.336) (0.033) (0.241) (0.241) (0.066)
Farmer -0.016 0.215 0.166 0.007 0.276 0.287 -0.024
(0.050) (0.339) (0.340) (0.030) (0.237) (0.237) (0.040)
Employee 0.068 0.390 0.285 0.000 0.063 0.068 0.037
(0.055) (0.370) (0.373) (0.029) (0.223) (0.222) (0.031)
Access to bank
Distance to closest branch in km -0.016 -0.127 -0.121 -0.005 -0.072 -0.066
(0.005)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.004) (0.027)*** (0.027)**
Asset Holdings and Education
Log Value of Household and Agricultural Assets 0.021 0.165 0.134 0.019 0.201 0.166
(0.013)* (0.090)* (0.091) (0.009)** (0.063)*** (0.062)***
Years of education (dummy for more than primary in Chile) 0.008 0.068 0.064 0.010 0.115 0.114 0.018
(0.004)** (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.004)** (0.027)*** (0.027)*** (0.008)**
Cognitive Ability/Financial Literacy
Raven's score (standardized) 0.011 0.140 0.140 0.006 0.035 0.031
(0.012) (0.083)* (0.082)* (0.010) (0.076) (0.076)
Financial Literacy/Numeracy Index (standarized)2 -0.009 -0.028 -0.031 -0.009 0.110 0.112
(0.012) (0.080) (0.079) (0.009) (0.062)* (0.062)*
Baseline Savings Activity
Stock saved in cash at home (2010 USD) -0.001 0.005 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001)*** (0.012)
Stock saved at Rosca (2010 USD) 0.013 0.024
(0.006)** (0.017)
Stock saved with friends/family (2010 USD,  1/100 USD for Chile) 0.000 0.003 0.470
(0.003) (0.004) (0.146)***
R-squared 0.054 0.085 0.094 0.047 0.099 0.110 0.048
Observations 1079 1079 1079 1049 1049 1049 917
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.167 1.588 1.588 0.100 1.476 1.476 0.192
Notes: OLS regressions, also include branch dummies for Uganda and Malawi. Some variables have missing data; to avoid dropping these observations, we set these values to 
zero, create dummies for having missing data and include these in the regressions (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
1Active is defined as making at least 5 deposits over the length of the study.
2Financial Literacy, was asked of a random half of the sample at baseline and for which we impute the mean of the financial literacy index.  The index was composed of 5 
questions about investments involving multiplication, averages and percentages.
 Deposits  (inverse 
hyperbolic sine 
transformation)
Uganda
Table 3. Correlates of Take-up among those in Treatment Group: Regression Analysis
 Deposits  (inverse hyperbolic 
sine transformation)
Malawi
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Table 4. Impacts on Flows: Deposits Last 30 days in 2010 USD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mobile Money Cash at home or in secret place ROSCA/VSLA
Panel A: Uganda
Treatment 0.741 -0.089 -0.352 0.095 0.426
(0.152)*** (0.047)* (0.44) (0.20) (0.56)
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 0.42 0.24 5.51 2.29 8.46
Std. Dev. 3.75 1.91 16.67 6.35 19.45
Obs. 6,026 6,023 6,015 6,013 5,993
Number of Households 2085 2083 2081 2081 2077
Panel B: Malawi
Treatment 0.132 -0.088 -0.039 0.005
(0.040)*** (0.14) (0.06) (0.16)
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 0.12 1.36 0.55 2.03
Std. Dev. 1.19 5.47 1.99 6.06
Obs. 5,903 5,902 5,903 5,902
Number of Households 2,046 2,046 2,046 2,046
Panel C: Pooled Treatment 0.44 -0.237 0.028 0.193
(0.080)*** (0.24) (0.11) (0.30)
Total Deposits
Notes: Pooled regression including three waves of follow-up data 12, 18 and 24 months after baseline. Panel C pools data from Uganda
and Malawi. We control for the baseline value of dependent variable (it is 0 in column 1 and not available in Malawi for column 4),
stratification dummies and wave dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. All dependent variables are top
winsorized at the 99th percentile. For Malawi,  data for savings in VSLA  are only available for the second and third follow-up.
1 Formal financial institutions include commercial banks, microfinance banks, and savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs).
Deposits at 
formal 
financial 
institutions1
Deposits in other sources
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Table 5. Impacts on Savings Stocks in 2010 USD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Received 
Informal 
Loan
Received 
Formal 
Loan
Panel A: Uganda
Treatment 8.780 -0.387 -2.743 -0.349 -0.813 0.003 4.98 0.001 0.007
(1.270)*** (0.188)** (1.544)* (0.79) (0.65) (0.01) (2.440)** (0.01) (0.01)
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 5.03 1.10 21.61 8.54 4.63 0.02 40.94 0.08 0.04
Std. Dev. 31.60 6.97 55.40 25.00 22.67 0.26 80.26 0.28 0.19
Obs. 6007 6027 6022 6028 6030 6017 5978 6033 6033
Number of Households 2085 2085 2085 2085 2085 2085 2085 2085 2085
Panel B: Malawi
Treatment 3.883 - -1.951 -0.438 -0.034 - 1.391 -0.006 0.005
(0.605)*** - (0.671)*** (0.236)* (0.019)* - (0.98) (0.01) (0.00)
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 2.15 - 9.20 2.45 0.10 - 13.87 0.04 0.02
Std. Dev. 15.08 - 26.15 8.63 0.82 - 32.57 0.20 0.14
Obs. 5900 - 5905 5906 5907 - 5898 5889 5889
Number of Households 2046 - 2046 2046 2046 - 2046 2040 2040
Panel C: Pooled Treatment 6.359 - -2.484 -0.400 -0.447 - 3.052 -0.002 0.006
(0.709)*** (0.862)*** (0.41) (0.33) (1.334)** (0.01) (0.00)
Notes: Pooled regression including three waves of follow-up data 12, 18 and 24 months after baseline. We control for the baseline value of dependent variable (we
replace missing values of dependent variables at baseline by 0 and include dummies for missing observations), dummies for stratification variables and wave dummies.
Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. All dependent variables are top winsorized at the 99th percentile. 
1Formal financial institutions include commercial banks, microfinance banks, and savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs).
2For Malawi,  data for savings in VSLA  are only available for the second and third follow-up.  
3Other cash savings: savings with shopkeeper or employer, farmer groups and village leader.  
4In Uganda, data for having "ever" received a loan; in Malawi: data on having received a loan in the last 6 months, and we control at baseline with a varible on having
"ever" received a loan. Informal Loan: from Rosca or Community Group (Uganda), Rosca, Village Bank or Moneylender (Malawi). Formal Loan: Bank, SACCO or
MFI. 
Cash at home 
or in Secret 
place
ROSCA/
VSLA2
Friends/F
amily
Other cash 
savings3
Total 
Monetary 
Savings 
Loans4
Formal 
Financial 
Institutions1
Mobile money
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Total Labor 
Income 
(last 3 
months)
Main or 
Secondary 
Economic 
Activity is a 
Business
Business 
Inventory 
(Monetary 
Value)
Self Reported 
Total 
Expenditures 
(Last Month)
Food 
Expenditures 
(last 7 days)
Lumpy 
Expenditures: 
Durables, 
Education and 
Home Repair 
(last year)
Health 
Expenditures 
(last month)
Expenditures 
on 
Agricultural 
Inputs (last 
month)
"Regret" 
Expenditures 
Index
Net 
Transfers to 
Friends or 
Relatives
Health 
Outcomes 
Index
Education 
Outcomes 
Index
Assets 
(house 
items and 
animals)
Panel A: Uganda
Treatment 0.502 0.000 -5.153 0.273 0.302 4.331 0.414 0.002 -0.008 -0.249 0.003 0.001 6.112
(3.68) (0.01) (5.11) (1.20) (0.21) (4.75) (0.37) (0.10) (0.02) (1.39) (0.02) (0.02) (12.89)
Baseline Mean in Control Group 75.76 0.68 57.01 29.97 4.91 120.80 9.52 1.58 -0.01 -8.62 0.00 0.06 335.00
Std. Dev. 145.20 0.47 104.80 35.64 5.82 179.90 22.16 4.55 0.80 25.46 0.68 0.91 415.60
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 82.32 0.73 90.84 33.26 5.74 89.49 6.53 0.78 0.00 -18.67 0.00 0.00 313.40
Std. Dev. 132.40 0.44 175.40 43.71 7.08 164.70 12.58 3.61 0.89 46.91 0.66 0.67 505.90
Obs. 6032 6033 6025 5994 6021 6031 6030 6027 6031 6033 6033 5519 6033
Number of Households 2085 2085 2082 2073 2084 2085 2085 2084 2084 2085 2085 2000 2085
Panel B: Malawi
Treatment 2.207 -0.004 0.585 0.416 0.193 0.015 -0.023 -0.018 0.047 0.071 -0.009 0.017 -6.309
(1.97) (0.01) (0.39) (0.84) (0.19) (0.61) (0.05) (0.03) (0.024)* (0.64) (0.02) (0.02) (3.331)*
Baseline Mean in Control Group 69.09 0.37 5.89 15.75 3.98 6.46 0.26 0.02 -0.01 -3.98 0.00 0.05 129.70
Std. Dev. 124.50 0.48 15.95 20.55 5.02 17.85 0.96 0.11 0.82 13.18 0.74 0.94 165.10
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 40.30 0.34 4.97 21.11 5.23 7.32 0.66 0.30 -0.03 -8.77 0.00 0.01 92.38
Std. Dev. 70.69 0.47 14.61 27.93 6.85 22.30 1.88 1.35 0.85 21.78 0.67 0.63 153.80
Obs. 5906 5907 5877 4676 5903 5902 5900 5902 5900 5907 5907 5419 5907
Number of Households 2046 2046 2036 2025 2046 2046 2045 2046 2045 2046 2046 1967 2046
Panel C: Pooled Treatment 1.139 -0.002 -2.417 0.365 0.242 2.057 0.197 -0.009 0.019 -0.112 -0.003 0.008 -0.197
(2.12) (0.01) (2.60) (0.77) (0.139)* (2.43) (0.19) (0.05) (0.02) (0.77) (0.02) (0.02) (6.79)
Table 6. Impacts on Downstream Outcomes in 2010 USD
Notes: Pooled regression including three waves of follow-up data 12, 18 and 24 months after baseline. We control for the baseline value of dependent variable, dummies for stratification variables and wave dummies. Standard
errors are clustered at the respondent level. All dependent variables are top winsorized at the 99th percentile. Total Labor Income: includes income from formal work, casual work, business, selling animals or animal produce and
selling crops; at baseline it was asked for "last month" and multiplied by 3. Business Inventory: winsorized at the 95th percentile to avoid the influence of large outliers. Food Expenditures: include staples, grains, vegetables,
fruits, meat, milk, eggs and salt. Lumpy Expenditures: Education expenditures include fees, uniforms and supplies, asked for the last 6 months at second monitoring in Malawi and multiplied by 2; Home Repair asked for last 6
months at second monitoring and endline in Malawi, multiplied by 2; Durable Expenditures asked only at baseline and first round in Malawi, include house and electronic equipment, vehicles, jewelry and furniture. Health 
Expenditures include medicines, fees, and other costs, asked for the last week at baseline in Uganda, multiplied by 4.3. Agricultural expenditures: asked for last year at baseline in Malawi, divided by 12. Indexes: defined to be the
equally weighted average of z-scores of the components, with the sign of each measure oriented so that more beneficial outcomes have higher scores. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control group mean and
dividing by the control group standard deviation of the respective variable in the same period. If an individual has a valid response to at least one component measure of an index, then the index is computed using the non-
missing components. Regret Expenditure Index: includes four variables measuring expenditures on goods for which respondent reports at baseline that "it was a bad idea to purchase", or "wants to spend less in the future given
constant income" using expenditure data collected in different modules. Net Transfers difference between transfer to friends/family minus transfer from friends/family including the self-reported value of both loans and gifts
given to/received from friends or family members (excluding partner). Health Index: dummy for no member of household sick last month, percentage of sick members treated (imputed 100% if no member sick) and dummy for
no member missed school or work because of illness last month. Education Index: percentage of school-age children enrolled, average number of school days attended last month by school-aged children (imputed 0 if not
enrolled), percentage of school-aged children enrolled in private schools, dummy for no school-aged child lacks a backpack, dummy for no school-aged child lacks full uniform. Assets: self-reported total value of cattle (only for
Uganda), other animals and household assets.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Thinks that saving 
for the future is 
more important 
than giving to 
friends/family
Thinks that 
saving is only 
for rich people
Thinks other 
people in 
household 
would get angry 
if saved alone
Has very high 
trust in banks
Has lost or 
knows someone 
who has lost 
money 
deposited in a 
bank
Decision Making 
Index (only for 
Women)
Internal Locus 
of Control 
Index 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Uganda
Treatment 0.000 -0.015 -0.001 0.104 -0.035 0.020 0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.022)*** (0.015)** (0.05) (0.02)
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 0.90 0.10 0.06 0.40 0.16 0.00 0.00
Obs. 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 662 1974
Panel B: Malawi
Treatment 0.015 0.006 -0.001 0.007 0.006 0.019 -0.015
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 0.62 0.02 0.04 0.84 0.05 0.00 0.00
Obs. 2046 2046 2046 2046 2046 750 1949
Panel C: Pooled Treatment 0.008 -0.004 -0.001 0.055 -0.014 0.021 -0.007
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.013)*** (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Table 7. Impacts on Savings Attitudes and Beliefs, Female Decision-making and Locus of Control
Notes: OLS regression using follow-up III data, 24 months after baseline. We control for the baseline value of dependent variable when available and dummies
for stratification variables. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. Indices: defined to be the equally weighted average of z-scores of its
components, with the sign of each measure oriented so that more beneficial outcomes have higher scores. The z-scores are calculated by subtracting the control
group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation. If an individual has a valid response to at least one component measure of an index, then the
index is computed using the non-missing components. Locus of Control Index: based on 8 questions with two options each, one reflecting internal control
(value 1) and the others external control (value 0), the index measures internal locus of control. Decision Making Index: based on seven questions asking who in
the household makes the decision about food, large items, children's schooling, children's health, personal health, social visits and business or work activities. We
created a dummy equal to 1 for each decision if respondent reports taking part in the decision alone or with someone else, and 0 if reports not taking part in the
decision. At baseline the questions were asked only of a random subsample, we impute mean values to missing observations and include a dummy for missing
data at baseline. Believes Saving is only for Rich People: in Malawi the question was whether they believe saving in a bank is only for rich people. Has Very
High Trust in Banks: omitted category includes two options: little or no trust in banks.
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(1) (2) (3)
Uganda Malawi Chile
Panel A. Why didn't you use accounts? (treatment group non-users only)
No money to save 0.80 0.89 0.07
Lack of trust in banks / formal institutions 0.03 0.00 0.11
Distance 0.01 0.01 0.00
Fees too high 0.01 0.02 0.03
Cannot provide minimum balance 0.05 0.15 0.00
Bureaucracy 0.03 0.03 0.00
Low interest rate 0.01 0.01 0.00
Not enough information 0.06 0.06 0.09
Cannot access money when needed 0.01 0.00 0.00
Not useful 0.09
Did not remember reason why did not open account 0.50
Number of respondents 377 554 430
Panel B. Reasons why bank account is not preferred savings vehicle (all treatment group individuals)
Not enough money to save in bank 0.33 0.17
Cash on hand needed soon, not worth depositing it for short while 0.33
At bank, money not available when needed 0.30 0.08
Distance from bank 0.18 0.16
Would need to save more before it’s worth the trip 0.37
Lack of trust in banks / formal institutions 0.06 0.02
Interest Rates/Returns 0.06 0.05
Too much bureaucracy/paperwork involved with bank 0.05
Lack of information about the account 0.03
Number of respondents 999 1025
Control Treatment Control Treatment
N/A, it is always easy to save 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07
Low Income 0.68 0.69 0.90 0.90
Expenses are too high 0.34 0.34 0.73 0.71
Unexpected emergencies always come up 0.36 0.41 0.82 0.83
Spend money easily before saving enough 0.13 0.15 0.60 0.63
Spouse would use the money for something else 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.09
Requests from neighbors/friends 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.07
Requests from relatives 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.11
Too many debts 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.18
No safe place to save 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.09
Number of respondents 991 999 991 999
Table 8. Self-Reported Reasons for Non-Use of an Account
Panel C. Self-reported reasons why it is difficult to save (Uganda only, endline survey)
First Reason 1st or 2nd Reason
Notes:  
Panel A: The question asked was: "What are the reasons you are not using a bank account at this time?"  It was asked only of 
those reporting not using an account.  The Non-user category was self-reported during the survey. In Chile, the question at 
endline was about the reasons on rejecting assistance for opening a bank account and was asked only of those who 
remembered having received and rejected the offer. 
Panel B:  Other instruments - Uganda: home, ROSCA, animals, mobile money; Malawi: home, ROSCA, animals,  VSLA. The 
question asked in Uganda and Malawi was, Option A: "Why did you put your money into [SOURCE] rather than into the 
bank/MFI/SACCO account?" Option B: "Why did you put your money into [SOURCE] rather than opening and using a 
bank/MFI/SACCO account?" No option was read aloud. 
Panel C:  for the First Reason, the question asked was: "What makes it sometimes difficult for you to save money?"  No 
option was read aloud. For the second reason each option was read aloud.36
(1) (2)
Mean Obs.
Panel A. Government Assistance
Receives some type of government assistance 0.73 622
Receives a pension 0.32 624
Receives either government assistance, a pension or both 0.85 623
Expects to receive a pension if does not currently receive one 0.76 395
Receives government transfer without a bank account 0.96 485
Thinks would be beneficial to have transfer deposited into a bank account 0.23 471
Panel B. Cost of Health Care 
Believes governmental programs would cover cost of a major surgery 0.86 622
If needed major surgery, co-pay would be 0% 0.62 639
If needed major surgery, co-pay would be 25% 0.19 639
Panel C. Access to Credit 
Ever got a loan or credit card from formal institution 0.30 1967
Has an active credit line or credit card 0.11 1927
Has bought an intem on installment payments last year 1 0.48 638
If you had an emergency that required [USD 600], how would you get the money?
Savings 0.01 1958
Reduce Expenses 0.04 1958
Loan from Bank or Financial Institution 0.17 1958
Loan from other source 0.05 1958
Family or Friends 0.23 1958
Does Not Know 0.27 1958
Would not be able to get the money 0.19 1958
Table 9. Factors Related to Low Take-up in Chile
Notes:  
Panel A and B present data from the follow-up survey conducted with a subsample of 639 respondents in May 2012. 
Panel C present data from the baseline survey conducted with 1,967 respondents between December 2010 and March 
2011.
1 Question asked in the follow-up survey.
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Account 
Take-up
Account 
Usage
Usage 
Measure*: 
monthly 
average 
deposits over 
sample 
assigned to 
treatment                              
(2015 USD 
dollars)
Usage 
Measure: 
Period 
used for 
monthly 
average
(See notes 
at bottom)
Individual 
Income 
(monthly 
equivalent) 
(2015 USD 
dollars)
Household 
Income 
(monthly 
equivalent) 
(2015 USD 
dollars)
Stat. sig 
treatment 
effect on 
(admin) bank 
savings? 
Stat. sig. 
treatment 
effect on 
total 
(reported) 
savings? 
Impact on Other 
Savings 
Instruments?
Statistically significant 
treatment effect on other 
outcomes?
Nominal 
Interest 
Rate
Inflation 
rate over 
study 
period
Panel A. This Paper
Uganda 2159 unbanked individuals
Cover Fees /Inform/Help 
Opening X 54%
32% (> 1 deposit), 
17% (> 4) 8.20 6 months 32 45 Yes Yes
(-) sig.: on mobile 
money and cash at 
home, (-) not sig. 
friends/family and 
Roscas
No 3% 10.7%
Malawi 2107 unbanked individuals
Cover Fees /Inform/Help 
Opening X X 69%
25% (> 1 deposit), 
10% (> 4) 3.07 6 months 29 37 Yes No
(-) sig. cash at home, 
friends/family and 
Roscas
No 1.50% 14%
Chile 1967 unbanked individuals Inform/Help Opening X X X X 17%
5% (> 1 deposits), 
3% (> 4) 2.54 6 months N/A 347 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0% 3.7%
Panel B.  Other Basic Savings Account Studies
Chin et al. (2015), U.S. 215 male unbanked Mexican immigrants
Assistance to get I.D. card 
required to open bank 
account (and paid for 
application fee) 
X X 43% N/A N/A 838 N/A N/A Yes (-) not sig.: any savings in Mexico
Increase in income and 
decrease of share 
remittances to income by 
those who lacked control 
over how remittances 
were spent
N/A
Dupas and Robinson 
(2013a), Kenya
170 female vendors, 
and 80 male bicycle 
taxi drivers, all 
unbanked
Cover Opening Fees 
/Inform/Help Opening X X X X X 87%
35% (> 1 deposit), 
17% (> 4 ) 8.22  6 months 66 N/A Yes N/A
(+) sig.: animal 
savings, (+) not sig.: 
rosca contributions
Yes (business investments, 
food and private 
expenditures, mainly for 
female vendors)
0% 10-14%
Dupas, Keats and 
Robinson (2015), Kenya 885 households
Cover Fees /Inform/ 
Help Opening, account 
offered to female or male 
head or both (randomized)
X X X 69% 28% (> 1 deposit), 15% (> 4) 3.33 6 months 18 26
Yes (dual-
headed 
household 
only)
Yes (dual-
headed 
household 
only)
(+) not sig.: Rosca 
contrib., money at 
home (+) sig. 
transfers to others,
Yes (increase in transfers 
out, decreases in transfers 
in)
0% 10-14%
Prina (2015), Nepal 1118 women living in slums
Cover Fees /Inform/Help 
Opening X X X 84% 80% (> 1 deposit) 6.81 6 months N/A 112 N/A Yes
(+) not sig.: non-
monetary assets 
(durables, livestock, 
gold), monetary 
assets (rosca, cash at 
home, friend/family), 
not reported 
separately
Yes (increase in index of 
reported financial 
situation, educational 
expenditures, fish and 
meat expenditures, higher 
ability to cope with 
shocks)  
6% 10.5%
* Notes for Usage Measure.  Dupas and Robinson (2013a): calculated from publicly available dataset. Dupas, Keats and Robinson (2015): provided by authors. Prina (2015): calculated from publicly available dataset. Ashraf et al. (2006b), Calculated from Table 1 Panel C.  Brune et al. (2015): Calculated based on treatment effects 
(treatment coefficient + control group mean) in Table 4, it includes direct deposits. Callen et al. (2014):  Calculated from Table 2  and email from authors, top 1% truncated.  Dupas and Robinson (2013b):  For the safebox we report total balance after 6 months divided by 6, this is a lower bound for average monthly deposits, we impute 
0 for non-users from Table 2. Karlan and Linden (2014):  Calculated based on Table 3, with parental outreach.  Karlan and Zinman (2014):  Monthly balance in the account including those making 0 deposits, calculated based on data reported in page 9. Karlan et al. (2016): amount saved at goal date from Table 3. Kast and Pomeranz 
(2014): calculated based on Table 2, email from authors. Schaner (2016): First panel includes deposits in individual accounts, second panel deposits in any account, short term results, email from author.  Somville and Vandewalle (2014): Does not include rewards directly deposited, provided by email from authors.
(continued next page)
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Account Take-up Account Usage
Usage Measure*: 
monthly average 
deposits over 
sample assigned to 
treatment                              
(2015 USD dollars)
Usage 
Measure: 
Period used 
for monthly 
average 
(See notes 
at bottom)
Individual 
Income 
(monthly 
equivalent) 
(2015 USD 
dollars)
Household 
Income 
(monthly 
equivalent) 
(2015 USD 
dollars)
Stat. sig 
treatment 
effect on 
(admin) bank 
savings? 
Stat. sig. 
treatment 
effect on 
total 
(reported) 
savings? 
Impact on 
Other 
Savings 
Instruments?
Statistically significant 
treatment effect on other 
outcomes?
Nominal 
Interest 
Rate
Inflation 
rate over 
study 
period
Panel C.  Other Studies
Ashraf et al. (2006a), 
Philippines
1777 current and 
former bank clients
Commitment Account with lockbox, 
offered automated transfers X X
28% (0% for autom. 
transf.) 14% (> 1 deposit)
N/A N/A 381 Yes Yes N/A N/A 4% 3.4%
Ashraf et al. (2006b), 
Philippines
346 current and 
former bank clients
Deposit collectors X X X 28% accepted service 15% (> 1 deposit) 0.66 10 months N/A 279 Yes N/A N/A N/A 4% 3.4%
Basic Savings Account, direct deposit of 
crop proceeds, raffles (prizes privately or 
publicly paid), financial education
X X 85% accepted account opening assistance
18% (> 0 direct 
deposits) 18.8 Yes No
As above + Commitment savings 
account X X X
Accepted assistance: 
82% (basic acct.), 90% 
(commitment act.)
21% (> 0 direct 
deposits)
19.2 (basic acct) + 1.4 
(commitment acct) Yes
Increases in land cultivation, 
agricultural inputs and outputs, 
and household expenditures
Callen et al. (2014), 
Sri Lanka
795 weekly income 
earners, no deposit 
last month
Account Opening, Deposit Collectors X X X X 89% 89% (> 0 deposits) 11.19  24 months 208 N/A Yes Yes N/A
Increases in income and 
expenditures,  increase working 
hours on the wage market
N/A
Cole et al (2011), 
Indonesia 564 unbanked
Financial incentives to open account  and 
financial training
X X
4% low incentive, 
9% med. incentive, 
13% highest incentive
8% of high incentives 
group used account last 
12 months
N/A N/A 121 N/A N/A N/A
Increase in the probability of 
having any savings for highest 
incentive group
If balance 
> $1.06, 
variable 
13%
Safe Box X X X 71% 1.15  6 months
Increase in preventative health 
investments and reached health 
goal
0%
Lockbox X X X X 66% 0.51 6 months No 0%
Health Pot X X X X X 72% N/A Increase in preventative health investments, reached health goal
0%
Health savings Account X X X 97% 0.36  6 months No N/A
Peru: 2,775 bank 
clients 
X X X X N/A 69% (met committed 
min. deposit per month)
105 At goal date, 
balance
N/A N/A No N/A N/A No
Bolivia: 9,376 bank 
clients 
X X X X N/A 56% (met committed 
min. deposit per month)
89 At goal date, 
balance
N/A N/A No N/A N/A Increased likelihood to reach commitment goal
Philippines: 1,409 
bank clients
X X X X 23% 21% (met commited 
amount saved)
26 At goal date, 
balance
169 N/A No N/A N/A No
School-based commitment device for 
education savings with parental outreach.  
Strong commitment: withdrawals 
restricted via voucher for educational 
expenses only.
X X X X X X N/A 39% (saved with program)
0.03 (per student), 
8.22 (per school)
5.33 (total 
income from 
work 
winsorized)
Increased 
savings in the 
program 
accounts
No  Higher expenditures on educational supplies
As above, but  weaker commitment: 
withdrawals in cash with strong 
encouragement to spend on educational 
expenses
X X X X X X N/A 42% (saved with program)
 0.02 (per student), 
4.15 (per school)
No No No No
Karlan and Zinman 
(2014), Philippines 9992 unbanked
Commitment account, lockbox, 
randomly allocated interest rate, 
individual vs. joint account
X X 23% 9% (> 1 deposit) 0.71  12 months 80 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 to 3% 2.5%
Kast and Pomeranz 
(2014), Chile
3560 informal 
business owners, 
borrowers from 
credit institution, 
90% females
Ordinary Account plus self-help group 
for half of treatment group, plus higher 
interest rate for a quarter of treatment
X X X 53% 16% (> 1 deposit),     
8% (> 4 ) 2.7 12 months
116 (per 
capita 
household 
income)
N/A Yes No N/A
Reduced short term borrowing, 
particularly to relatives and 
friends, improved subjective 
welfare, less likely to cut 
consumption if shock
0.3% (75% 
of accts.) 
or 5%  real 
rate
7%
Individual ordinary savings accounts for 
husband and/or wife X X
31% 6% (> 1 deposit) 0.56 (individual accounts)
0%
Individual or joint ordinary savings 
accounts + Interest rate subsidies X X X
48% (individual r)-
78% (joint r), with 
20% subsidy
15% (individual r), 34% 
(joint r) (>1 deposit), 
with 20% subsidy
7.46 (individual r)
8.28 (joint r), with 
20% subsidy
4, 12 or 
20%
Somville and 
Vandewalle (2015), 
India
442 individuals  
(46% unbanked)
Weekly interviews with tasks paid either 
in cash or into accounts. Opened 
accounts for all participants
X X X 100% 46% (> 0 deposits) 1.13 3 months N/A N/A Yes Yes
(+) not sig.: 
post office. (-) 
not sig.: cash 
home
Reduction in frequently 
consumed items
4% 5%
Karlan et al. (2016), 
Peru, Bolivia, 
Philippines
Reminders for people with recently 
opened commitment accounts 1 to 3% 2.6%
0% 10%Karlan and Linden 
(2016), Uganda
Students in 136 
elementary schools 24 months N/A N/A
Increase in income and assets 
after 30 months for participants 
receiving higher individual 
interest rates. Individual interest 
rates increase entrepreneurship 
rates, joint rates increase public 
goods investment 
3.4% 
(during 6 
months of 
account 
usage)
Usage Measure: See notes in previous page
Schaner (2016), 
Kenya
749 unbanked 
couples  6 months
64 N/A
Long run 
impact on 
average daily 
bank balances 
only for 
individual 
account with 
subsidies
Reallocation 
of total 
assets to the 
subsidized 
spouse (20% 
interest rate)
 
Invidual/spou
se: (-) sig: 
SACCOs,  (+) 
sig. home 
savings, not 
sig.: Rosca, 
mobile 
N/A 2.5% 7.7%
Dupas and Robinson 
(2013b), Kenya
771 members of 113 
ROSCAs N/A
38 N/A
22 (tobacco 
farmers in the 
region)
N/A N/A
N/AN/A N/A
Table 10 (continued). Comparison with Other Studies
Detailed Features of Intervention
Brune et al. (2015), 
Malawi
3150 cash crop 
farmers in farmer 
clubs.
 8 months
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Web Appendix A: Sampling Details
Uganda
In Uganda, we first performed a census of all households living within a 12-km radius of one of
the three MAMIDECOT branches in the sampled districts of Bukomansimbi and Kalungu.
The census identified 9,287 households. Since the focus of our study was on unbanked
households, we removed the 26% of the sample (2,415 households) who had bank accounts,
and the additional 2% of the unbanked who had loans from banks or MFIs (152 households),
leaving 6,720 unbanked households. We further excluded 775 households with no head in
farming, services or vendor (these are households where both heads are civil servants, work
in transportation, fishing or are unemployed), 86 households with a civil servant head, 828
households who were deemed to live too far away from the partner bank to benefit from
an account (since they had not visited the market center of the nearest MAMIDECOT
branch in more than a month), 701 households with no female head, 26 households with two
female heads (polygamous households), 91 households with female heads older than 60 and
18 households not willing to participate in a new survey. These exclusion criteria reduced
the sample to 4,195 households. Of this sample of 4,195 households, we then selected 3,000
for inclusion in the study, oversampling those receiving non-agricultural income since this
was a less common occupation than agriculture, but which was the primary focus of previous
studies such as Dupas and Robinson (2013a).31
A few months after the census, a detailed baseline survey was administered. The project
targeted a specific individual within the household, not the household as a whole. The
following rule was used to select respondents: if there are two heads, and they are both
non-farmers or both farmers, pick randomly among the two heads; if there are two heads,
and one is farmer and the other is not, pick the non-farmer.32
Out of the 3,000 households sampled, 2,442 answered the survey.33 For treatment assign-
ment we excluded an additional 282 households who reported in the baseline survey having
31The probability of being included in the sample was: (1) 100% for households in which at least one
spouse was primarily employed in self-employment outside of agriculture (vending or services); and (2) 54%
for households employed only in agriculture.
32We were not always able to enroll the selected household head in the study, especially if the male head
of household was selected. In such cases, the respondent was replaced with his or her spouse. In total, 30%
of men sampled for the study could not be surveyed at baseline and so were replaced by their wife (for that
survey as well as the rest of the study), while only 3% of female respondents were replaced by their husbands.
For this reason, our sample is predominantly composed of women (even among dual-headed households).
We therefore do not emphasize gender differences in outcomes.
33We were not able to locate 241 households listed in the census and the rest who did not respond mainly
moved outside the area of the study.
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an account at a formal institution, leaving us a sample of 2,160 eligible households.34
Out of the final 2,160 eligible households, 50% were randomly allocated to receive the
vouchers. Randomization was stratified by gender, occupation35 and bank branch (recall
there were 3 branches in the study). For treatment households, account opening occurred
4-5 months after the baseline. Individuals in the treatment group were visited by a MAMIDE-
COT agent.36
The agents gave some basic information about MAMIDECOT and the accounts, and
also explained that the accounts normally featured various fees that would be waived for
the study period. At the conclusion of the visit, the agents gave respondents a voucher
which could be brought to MAMIDECOT and redeemed for a free account (these vouchers
expired after 4 months). Beneficiaries of the free account were informed that the monthly
maintenance fees would be waived for a total of 21 months, after which the promotion would
end and account holders would have to cover it on their own, in practice the promotion
ended in March, 2013, 24 months after vouchers were distributed.
Malawi
In Malawi, we conducted a census of all households from 65 villages within a 30-km radius
of one of the two selected NBS branches (Balaka and Liwonde). This census identified
7,266 households. As in Uganda, we sought to enroll a sufficient sample of self-employed
individuals. To this end, we performed an additional census of small business owners at 6
markets within the catchment area of the bank branches, which identified an additional 2,031
respondents. The total identified sample was thus 9,297 households; we have data for 9,268
of them. We first dropped 1,415 households (15%) with an account at a formal financial
institution.
Similar to Uganda, we consecutively excluded 41 households with no head in farming,
services or vendor (these are households where both heads are civil servants or are unem-
ployed), 79 households with a civil servant head, 133 households that were inadvertently
included in the sample but report not being within 30km of the location of the branch for
most of the year, 513 households with no female head and 477 polygamous households. These
exclusion criteria reduced the sample to 6,610 households. Unlike Uganda, we did not screen
on having an older female head or on being employed in fishing/transport. We also dropped
78 households for which we do not know if they were interviewed at home or at the market.
34Some of them just opened the accounts between the census and the baseline survey, while others had
not reported the accounts in the census.
35Households occupations in our final sample were: employee, self-employed: vendor, business owner,
trader; or farmer: including animal rearing, housewife or unemployed.
36See footnote 17 in the text.
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This final sample included 5,531 households from the household census and 1,001 households
from the market census.
We then randomly sampled 2,185 (65%) of the 5,531 eligible households from the house-
hold census and 371 (50%) of the 742 households from the market census that also satisfied
the condition that the respondent was in either in vending or other business owner (e.g. we
dropped an additional number of 259 respondents in other occupations). This resulted in
our final sample of 2,556 households. To select the individual to be interviewed, the selection
process was identical to the one used in Uganda: if there are two heads, and they are both
non-farmers or both farmers, pick randomly among the two heads; if there are two heads,
and one is farmer and the other is not, pick the non-farmer.37
A detailed baseline survey similar to the one used in Uganda was conducted a few months
after the census. Out of the 2,556 individuals sampled, 2,208 answered the survey.38 For
treatment assignment we excluded an additional 101 individuals who reported in the baseline
survey having an account at a formal institution.39 Out of the final 2,107 eligible individuals,
50% (1,053) were randomly selected to receive the vouchers.
Randomization stratification was similar, but slightly different from Uganda: random-
ization was stratified by: occupation,40 gender, marital status, literacy, and whether the
respondent was from the household or market sample.
As in Uganda, account opening occurred 4-5 months after the baseline. Individuals in
the treatment group were visited by a NBS agent.41 The agents gave some basic information
about NBS and the accounts, and also explained that the accounts normally featured various
fees that would be waived for the study period. At the conclusion of the visit, the agents
gave respondents a voucher which could be brought to NBS and redeemed for a free account
(these vouchers expired after 4 months). Beneficiaries of the free account were informed that
the monthly maintenance fees would be waived for a total of 18 months, after which the
promotion would end and account holders would have to cover it on their own. In practice
voucher distribution happened in June/July 2011, and the promotion ended in June 2013,
37We sampled 1,454 female and 1,102 male respondents. However, as in Uganda, we were not always
able to enroll the selected household head in the study and it was more common for men to be absent than
women. 27% of men sampled for the study could not be surveyed at baseline and were replaced by their
wife for that survey and the rest of the study. 2.5% of female respondents were replaced by their husbands.
Here again, this means that the men in our sample are a somewhat selected set.
38We were not able to locate 130 individuals listed in the census, 81 denied consent to conduct the survey,
and the rest who did not respond mainly moved outside the area of the study.
39Some of them just opened the accounts between the census and the baseline survey, while others had
not reported the accounts in the census.
40Occupations were: employee, vendor, business owner, trader/farmer or animal rearing, cash crop farmer,
and housewife or unemployed
41See footnote 19 in the text.
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24 months later.
Chile
While the experimental design was very similar in Malawi and Uganda, it was quite different
in Chile. In Chile we partnered with BancoEstado, the only public commercial bank and
the third largest bank in Chile. BancoEstado offers an account, called “CuentaRUT”, that
every Chilean with a national Chilean ID/tax number (the “RUT”) is eligible to open free
of charge. Despite the fact that CuentaRUT accounts are free, their take-up is low among
those who live in small towns or villages lacking a bank branch. To increase inclusion,
BancoEstado recently developed a network of point of sales in local stores (POS, or Cajas
Vecina), through which BancoEstado account holders can make deposits, withdrawals and
bill payments. CuentaRUT accounts can be opened online, but still require one visit to a
branch for activating the ATM card, signing a contract and registering a signature. Besides
deposits and withdrawals from a BancoEstado account, several other transactions can be
made through a CajaVecina, such as utility payment or cell phone minutes purchases. While
deposits (up to 5 per month), purchases and payments are free of cost, withdrawals are
charged $0.62 per transaction if made at the CajaVecina or ATM, and $1.24 if made at a
branch of the bank (these fees were not covered by the study). The same cost applies to
deposits after the 5th deposit in a given month. Moreover, the maximum balance allowed
in the account is around $6,300, and monthly deposits have a limit of around $4,000. The
account is equivalent to a transaction account and does not pay interest rate.
Chile differed methodologically from the other sites in that the census exercise was not
representative of the entire region, enumerators went door-to-door until they reached a sam-
ple size of nearly 2,000 eligible households, whereas in Uganda and Malawi the whole targeted
areas were censused and a sample was taken for the baseline. A door-to-door census exercise
was conducted in 48 Comunas of Region IX in Southern Chile. During that census exercise
9,985 respondents were interviewed, out of which 74% already had bank accounts (either the
respondent or spouse). Of the 2,472 respondents without a bank account, 1,975 were willing
to enroll and complete a baseline survey, the others refused to provide their RUT and so
were not considered for the study. Among those who were eligible and enrolled in the study,
half were selected to receive procedural assistance to open one of BancoEstado’s free bank
accounts, the CuentaRut. Treatment was assigned based on the last digit of the RUT: odd
numbers were assigned to treatment, and even numbers to the control group. Treatment
was not stratified on any characteristics.
Households were informed of the existence of the CuentaRUT account, invited to open
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an account with BancoEstado, and if interested received assistance with the account opening
process. In particular, we provided an internet-connected computer for the online application
and reminded people of the necessary steps to take for account activation.
In total, 938 households were offered an account. Of this group, only 17% signed up and
activated their account within a few months.
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Web Appendix B
Banking the Unbanked? Evidence from three countries
Pascaline Dupas, Dean Karlan, Jonathan Robinson and Diego Ubfal
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Table WA1. Analysis of Attrition in follow-up surveys
Dependent Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Web Appendix B 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.06)
Interactions Between Treatment and Covariate:
Female 0.03 0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Not Married -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
Female x  Not Married -0.03 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Household Size 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Age (1/10s of years) -0.01 -0.05
(0.04) (0.025)**
Age Squared 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.003)**
Entrepreneur -0.03 -0.01
(0.04) (0.03)
Farmer -0.01 0.00
(0.04) (0.03)
Employee -0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.03)
Distance to closest branch in km 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Log Value of Household and Agricultural Assets 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Years of education 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Observations 2159 2159 2107 2106
F-test p-value for joint significance of 
interaction terms 0.71 0.33
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Binary=1 if respondent was not interviewed in any of the three 
follow-up surveys
Notes:   OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.  All explanatory variables are measured at baseline.   
Regressions include the level of all covariates used in the interactions with treatment. Binary control variables were included  
for missing observations of a covariate, and then missing covariates were replace by zero.  We also included two branch 
dummies for Uganda and one for Malawi.  Significance levels: *10 percent, **5 percent, *** 1 percent.
MalawiUganda
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Control 
Mean 
(S.D.)
Treatment 
difference 
(Std. Err.)
Control 
Mean 
(S.D.)
Treatment 
Difference 
(Std. Err.)
Panel A. Demographics and SES
Female 0.72 0.00 0.68 0.00
(0.45) (0.02) (0.47) (0.02)
Main Occupation
Entrepreneur 0.45 0.01 0.37 0.00
(0.50) (0.02) (0.48) (0.02)
Farmer 0.33 -0.01 0.23 0.00
(0.47) (0.02) (0.42) (0.02)
Employee 0.17 0.00 0.29 -0.01
(0.38) (0.02) (0.45) (0.02)
Housewife/Unemployed 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.00
(0.22) (0.01) (0.31) (0.01)
Age 36.27 0.17 39.86 -0.36
(11.90) (0.53) (17.09) (0.74)
Married 0.71 0.00 0.72 0.00
(0.45) (0.02) (0.45) (0.02)
Household size 5.15 -0.03 4.62 -0.07
(2.38) (0.10) (2.00) (0.09)
Years of education 5.49 0.00 4.20 -0.16
(2.95) (0.13) (3.45) (0.15)
Acres of Land Owned by household 1.53 0.05 2.19 0.07
(2.19) (0.11) (1.88) (0.09)
Value of Household and Agricultural Assets  372.78 35.80 145.00 3.92
(697.99) (67.96) (274.00) (16.87)
Distance to bank branch in km 2.71 -0.10 6.00 -0.29
(2.03) (0.09) (3.20) (0.14)
Panel B. Savings
Participates in ROSCA 0.23 0.00 0.05 -0.01
(0.42) (0.02) (0.22) (0.01)
Holds savings in cash at home 0.97 -0.02 0.49 0.00
(0.18)      (0.01)** (0.50) (0.02)
Holds savings with friends/family 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.01
(0.31) (0.01) (0.25) (0.01)
Holds savings in mobile money account1 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.18) (0.01) 0.00 0.00
Holds other cash savings2 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.15) (0.01) (0.07) 0.00
Total Monetary Savings 30.26 -3.16 11.98 0.49
(105.12) (4.28) (45.60) (2.13)
If you needed USD 22 / 26  urgently, how would you get the money?
   Would use (only) savings 0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.21)      (0.01)** (0.13) (0.01)
   Would use savings and other method 0.27 0.02 0.04 0.00
(0.44) (0.02) (0.20) (0.01)
   Would borrow/ask from friends/family 0.78 0.02 0.38 -0.01
(0.81) (0.04) (0.63) (0.03)
   Would sell animals 0.36 0.03 0.07 0.03
(0.90) (0.04) (0.33)      (0.02)*
   Would be impossible to get it 0.16 0.00 0.41 -0.03
(0.40) (0.02) (0.49) (0.02)
Panel C. Income and Expenditures
Total Expenditures (last month) 31.63 -1.47 17.58 -1.18
(51.05) (2.00) (46.11) (1.64)
Labor Income (last month) 32.99 -6.02 25.69 2.72
(96.84) (4.53) (67.85) (3.84)
P-value (Joint F-test) 0.74 0.40
Observations 2085 2046
Table WA2. Summary Statistics, Restricted to respondents who answered at least one follow-up
Uganda Malawi
Notes: See Table 1 48
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dependent Variable
Web Appendix B 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interactions Between Treatment and Covariate:
Female 0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.031)*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Not Married -0.11 -0.11 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.12
(0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.20)
Female x  Not Married 0.08 0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.16
(0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.17) (0.20)
Household Size 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age (1/10s of years) -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Age Squared 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.004)* (0.01)
Entrepreneur -0.10 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 -0.04
(0.056)* (0.06) (0.06) (0.040)** (0.04) (0.04)
Farmer -0.12 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03
(0.057)** (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Employee -0.10 -0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.02
(0.062)* (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Distance to closest branch in km 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log Value of Household and 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
  Agricultural Assets (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Years of education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adjusted R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Observations 2159 2159 2159 2159 2159 2159 2107 2106 2107 2106 2107 2106
F-test p-value for joint significance 
of interaction terms 0.57 0.56 0.36 0.21 0.26 0.30
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
Table WA3. Analysis of Attrition in follow-up surveys by round
Attriter Follow-
up I
Attriter Follow-
up II
Attriter Follow-
up III
Notes:   OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses.  All explanatory variables are measured at baseline.   Regressions include the 
level of all covariates used in the interactions with treatment. Binary control variables were included  for missing observations of a covariate, and 
then missing covariates were replace by zero.  We also included two branch dummies for Uganda and one for Malawi.  Significance levels: *10 
percent, **5 percent, *** 1 percent.
Uganda
Attriter Follow-
up I
Attriter Follow-
up II
Attriter Follow-
up III
Malawi
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Panel A. Uganda
Total Amount Deposited in Partner Institution Month Before Survey
Web Appendix B Mean sd p95 p99
Share 
>0
Mean 
win N Mean sd p95 p99
Share 
>0
Mean 
win N
Follow-up I 1.54 13.94 3.68 40.50 0.06 0.79 1014 4.37 49.12 3.68 77.68 0.06 1.26 1014
Follow-up II 2.48 15.38 3.79 75.70 0.06 1.67 1002 3.34 23.69 0.00 102.20 0.05 1.53 1002
Follow-up III 2.47 20.61 2.57 53.17 0.05 1.05 999 1.39 15.76 0.00 36.67 0.03 0.20 999
Average 2.13 11.24 12.22 50.47 0.13 1.15 1041 2.94 22.54 12.27 63.09 0.10 0.97 1041
Average no missing 2.18 11.42 12.25 50.47 0.13 1.17 943 3.22 23.67 13.44 64.35 0.10 1.05 943
Balance in Partner Institution at the time of the survey
Follow-up I 16.48 67.91 73.63 276.13 0.42 13.11 1010 15.92 83.75 59.05 301.99 0.36 12.55 1010
Follow-up II 18.40 109.27 88.95 272.53 0.37 14.35 997 12.91 64.51 51.35 250.13 0.37 10.22 997
Follow-up III 23.86 186.55 91.67 315.33 0.28 14.46 997 10.02 60.65 35.25 195.69 0.38 6.96 997
Average 21.02 139.92 85.87 247.93 0.49 13.91 1041 12.53 57.89 56.40 226.04 0.39 9.60 1041
Average no missing 15.94 44.37 84.34 212.37 0.51 13.79 945 13.63 60.62 64.51 235.75 0.40 10.40 945
Panel B. Malawi
Total Amount Deposited in Partner Institution Month Before Survey
Follow-up I 1.00 7.12 2.07 47.42 0.06 0.50 994 2.62 22.26 2.96 65.21 0.06 0.90 994
Follow-up II 0.23 1.91 0.00 10.56 0.03 0.13 988 2.45 17.11 1.23 70.43 0.05 1.19 988
Follow-up III 0.35 3.76 0.00 11.81 0.03 0.14 976 0.43 6.62 0.00 11.81 0.01 0.00 976
Average 0.55 3.38 1.76 17.78 0.10 0.27 1025 1.77 10.61 6.89 40.40 0.08 0.68 1025
Average no missing 0.49 2.72 1.58 17.72 0.10 0.25 941 1.92 11.06 8.22 48.97 0.09 0.73 941
Balance in Partner Institution at the time of the survey
Follow-up I 10.60 53.99 41.50 231.20 0.35 7.86 993 8.57 45.49 49.29 207.48 0.37 7.14 993
Follow-up II 9.31 109.22 31.69 144.38 0.23 5.17 987 6.72 29.61 34.91 140.55 0.37 5.90 987
Follow-up III 6.51 31.49 29.53 150.59 0.19 5.19 975 7.59 51.45 38.13 117.86 0.38 5.14 975
Average 9.23 46.05 39.52 155.85 0.41 6.32 1025 8.14 42.15 43.12 143.68 0.38 6.15 1025
Average no missing 8.76 44.68 39.52 143.92 0.42 6.03 938 7.34 30.76 44.49 121.62 0.39 6.03 938
Notes:  Mean win: mean after winsorizing the top 1% of all observations in our sample (including 0s and the control group observations). Average 
no missing: average for observations with no missing values in any round for both survey and administrative data.
Survey Data
Table WA4.  Reported vs. Administrative Data
Admin Data
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Table WA5. Impacts on Flows: Deposits Last 30 days in 2010 USD. Non Winsorized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mobile Money Cash at home or in Secret place ROSCA/VSLA
Web Appendix B
Treatment 0.239 -0.133 1.144 0.158 1.26
(0.71) (0.29) (2.30) (0.29) (2.48)
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 2.04 0.74 6.94 2.54 12.28
Std. Dev. 29.60 11.26 36.06 8.90 50.35
Obs. 6,026 6,023 6,015 6,013 5,993
Number of Households 2085 2083 2081 2081 2077
Panel B: Malawi
Treatment 0.153 -0.224 -0.041 -0.162
(0.13) (0.30) (0.10) (0.36)
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 0.40 1.82 0.69 2.95
Std. Dev. 5.07 12.98 3.36 14.92
Obs. 5,903 5,902 5,903 5,902
Number of Households 2,046 2,046 2,046 2,046
Panel C: Pooled Treatment 0.196 0.453 0.06 0.51
(0.36) (1.18) (0.15) (1.27)
Total Deposits
Notes:  Pooled regression including three waves of follow-up data 12, 18 and 24 months after baseline. We control for the baseline value of dependent variable if 
available, stratification  dummies and wave dummies.  Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.  For Malawi,  data for savings in VSLA  are only 
available for the second and third follow-up.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
Deposits at formal 
financial institutions
Deposits in other sources
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Table WA6. Impacts on Savings Stocks in 2010 USD. Non winsorized
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Received 
Informal 
Loan
Received 
Formal 
Loan
Web Appendix B
Treatment 6.478 -2.136 0.167 -0.864 4.147 -1.249 7.267 0.001 0.007
(4.62) (1.205)* (3.71) (0.98) (4.57) (0.93) (7.83) (0.01) (0.01)
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 14.32 3.53 26.59 9.65 7.38 2.18 63.47 0.08 0.04
Std. Dev. 126.40 62.74 108.60 35.71 56.35 39.06 216.30 0.28 0.19
Obs. 6007 6027 6022 6028 6030 6017 5978 6033 6033
Number of Households 2085 2085 2085 2085 2085 2085 2085 2085 2085
Panel B: Malawi
Treatment 5.148 - -5.236 -0.589 -0.399 - -1.182 -0.006 0.005
(1.604)*** - (2.561)** (0.37) (0.28) - (2.98) (0.01) (0.00)
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 3.78 - 13.47 3.12 0.77 - 21.25 0.04 0.02
Std. Dev. 38.29 - 126.00 13.58 12.32 - 136.10 0.20 0.14
Obs. 5900 - 5905 5906 5907 - 5898 5889 5889
Number of Households 2046 - 2046 2046 2046 - 2046 2040 2040
Panel C: Pooled Treatment 5.848 - -2.615 -0.724 1.814 - 3.060 -0.002 0.006
(2.471)** (2.27) (0.53) (2.32) (4.23) (0.01) (0.00)
Notes: Pooled regression including three waves of follow-up data 12, 18 and 24 months after baseline. We control for the baseline value of dependent variable (we
replace missing values of dependent variables at baseline by 0 and include dummies for missing observations), dummies for stratification variables and wave dummies.
Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. 
1Formal financial institutions include commercial banks, microfinance banks, and savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs).
2For Malawi,  data for savings in VSLA  are only available for the second and third follow-up.  
3Other cash savings: savings with shopkeeper or employer, farmer groups and village leader.  
4In Uganda, data for having "ever" received a loan; in Malawi: data on having received a loan in the last 6 months, and we control at baseline with a varible on having
"ever" received a loan. Informal Loan: from Rosca or Community Group (Uganda), Rosca, Village Bank or Moneylender (Malawi). Formal Loan: Bank, SACCO or MFI. 
Cash at home 
or in Secret 
place
ROSCA/
VSLA2
Friends/F
amily
Other cash 
savings3
Total 
Monetary 
Savings 
Loans4
Formal 
Financial 
Institutions1
Mobile money
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Table WA7. Impacts on Savings  using Administrative Data instead of Reported Data 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Web Appendix B
Treatment 1.241 0.926 7.124 3.091
(0.172)*** (0.559)* (1.427)*** (2.46)
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 0.42 8.46 5.03 40.94
Std. Dev. 3.75 19.45 31.60 80.26
Obs. 6,027 5,994 6021 5991
Number of Households 2085 2077 2085 2085
Panel b: Malawi
Treatment 0.73 0.603 3.963 1.463
(0.092)*** (0.189)*** (0.739)*** (1.06)
Dep. Var. Mean in Control Group 0.12 2.03 2.15 13.87
Std. Dev. 1.19 6.06 15.08 32.57
Obs. 5,903 5,902 5904 5902
Number of Households 2,046 2,046 2046 2046
Notes:  Pooled regression including three waves of follow-up data 12, 18 and 24 months after baseline. We 
control for the baseline value of dependent variable if available (we replace missing values of dependent 
variables at baseline by 0 and include dummies for missing observations), dummies for stratification 
variables and wave dummies.  Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. All dependent variables 
are top winsorized at the 99th percentile.
1 Formal financial institutions include commercial banks, microfinance banks, and savings and credit 
cooperatives (SACCOs). For respondents that report at least one deposit in the financial institution we 
worked with, we replace reported balance by administrative data at the moment of the survey (in Uganda we 
replace balance in SACCOs by administrative balance and in Malawi we replace balance in commercial 
banks by administrative balance, without changing the other self-reported categories). 
Saving Stock at 
Formal 
Financial 
Institutions1
Total 
Monetary 
Savings Stock
Total Deposits 
(including 
ROSCAs, 
home savings, 
etc.)
Deposits at 
formal 
financial 
institutions1
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Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Monthly 
Equivalent 
Share of Total 
Expenditure Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Monthly 
Equivalent Share 
of Total 
Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Web Appendix B
Total Self-Reported, last 30 days 30.09 35.93 100% 16.12 21.64 100%
Food, last 7 days 4.98 5.89 71% 4.28 5.29 114%
Durables, last year 14.21 46.48 4% 1.92 8.52 1%
Home Construction, last year 10.67 57.13 3% 0.19 1.19 0%
Education, last year 90.40 151.39 25% 4.83 15.69 2%
Health, last 30 days (monthly equivalent for Uganda) 9.44 21.87 31% 0.31 1.10 2%
Agricultural Inputs, last 30 days 1.55 4.50 5% 0.02 0.10 0%
Regrets*, last 30 days 2.39 5.15 8% 5.21 13.87 32%
Panel B. How they earn their money: Income by source (in 2010 USD)
Calculated Total Labor Income, last 30 days 23.33 44.24 100% 21.10 39.14 100%
Selling Animals 3.13 13.82 13% 2.38 9.83 11%
Selling Animal Produce 0.29 1.98 1% 0.00 0.00 0%
Selling Crops 1.60 6.13 7% 0.34 2.00 2%
Selling Other Products 0.05 0.47 0% 0.20 1.21 1%
Business 15.24 34.34 65% 14.03 37.09 66%
Casual Work 2.89 8.06 12% 3.37 7.10 16%
Formal Work 0.14 1.15 1% 0.84 4.68 4%
Details on Farming Last Harvest
Farmed at least 1 crop 0.87 0.33 0.96 0.19
Sold at least 1 crop 0.66 0.47 0.50 0.50
Value (in 2010 USD) of crops sold 48.66 100.80 85.87 133.83
Percentage of the harvest consumed 84.21 18.37 86.81 20.17
Panel C. Monetary Transfers  (in 2010 USD)
Total Received (excluding from spouse), last 90 days 12.42 27.51 4.58 12.16
Total Given (excluding to spouse), last 90 days 3.14 9.53 0.74 3.67
Total Received From spouse, last 30 days 3.20 8.97 0.00 0.00
Total Given to Spouse, last 30 days 2.07 6.83 0.00 0.00
Panel D. Shocks
Any household member sick, last month 0.82 0.38 0.74 0.44
Affected by Shock, last month 0.38 0.49 0.18 0.38
Panel E. Savings (in 2010 USD)
Rosca deposits, last month 2.06 6.14 0.00 0.00
Adding to Home Savings, last month 2.40 7.03 2.15 6.98
Saving Stocks
Home Savings 13.35 33.13 7.73 23.46
Roscas 4.50 13.77 0.20 1.41
Friends/Family 3.47 17.29 0.90 5.04
Panel F. Other Inflows of Money Last 30 days
Witdrawals from Bank or Mobile Money 0.12 1.12 0.00 0.00
Formal Loans 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rents 0.14 1.03 0.06 0.50
Remittances 0.70 3.21
Pension 0.00 0.00
Observations 2159 2107
Table WA8. Additional Summary Statistics for Uganda and Malawi samples
Uganda Malawi
Notes: Values of the variables collected in Round 1 Survey  (Oct-Nov 2010 in Uganda, Feb-Mar 2011 in Malawi ).  All continuous variables are 
top winsorized at the 99% and expressed in June 2010 US dollars. 
*Regrets= total expenditures on goods people report it was a "bad idea" to purchase.
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